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ABSTRACT 
The cost-benefit equation of the Pak-U.S. alliance, in the fight against terrorism, reflects 
a direct correlation between the fluctuating patterns of U.S. assistance and their direct and 
indirect implications for Pakistan.  While the U.S. strives to achieve a better return on its 
investment through military-oriented support, Pakistan seeks to adopt an approach that 
suits both the U.S. and its own domestic and regional interests. This research traces the 
trend of Pak-U.S. relations, highlights the impact of the fluctuating U.S. aid in shaping 
perceptions, and provides a game theoretical analysis on the issue. Besides highlighting 
measures to achieve cost effectiveness through micro alliances, decentralization, 
accountability, and transparency in fund management, the study supports development of 
entrepreneurial culture and micro-alliances in Pakistan. More importantly, it provides an 
in-depth analysis of the military and population-centric approaches and their associated 
costs and benefits for the two countries.  The research concludes by suggesting a more 
population-centric U.S. approach towards Pakistan to achieve a better return on 
investment besides laying foundation for a long-term strategic alliance. It suggests future 
research on the prospects and methodology of achieving a long-term partnership between 
the two nations. 
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A decade has elapsed since Pakistan and the U.S. joined hands in the fight against 
terrorism.  During all this time, the focus of most media remained on trying to analyze the 
Pakistani role in the Pak-U.S. alliance. While most of the written work has treated 
Pakistan as a sanctuary to insurgents, others have aired a different viewpoint—that 
security cooperation with Pakistan is the key to the United States‘ meeting its objectives 
in the region.  Not much has been written on the balance of foreign aid and the amount 
that goes into ‗Defense Expenditure‘ in comparison to population-centric investment.  
Furthermore, there has not been an analysis of the conflict of priorities between the 
donors and the actual recipients of the aid. 
Pakistan, due to her crucial geo-strategic location, was considered a critical node 
in the war on terror, providing much needed diplomatic, military and logistic support to 
the U.S. and its allies for operations in Afghanistan.  The decision to join the U.S. in the 
war has not only created a socio-political split within Pakistan‘s population and state 
elements but has also cost Pakistan billions of dollars in economic activities besides 
weakening the socio-political infrastructure.  While the government continues to support 
the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, gaining favorable public opinion (from the U.S. or the 
alliance) remains elusive, primarily due to the U.S. operations (specifically the drone 
strikes) inside Pakistan and the declining socio-economic situation (with less of economic 
assistance from the U.S.). 
The Pak-U.S. relationship is at a sensitive juncture today in the post-Bin Laden 
era.  While Pakistan suffers from its worst ever economic, security, and political 
situation, the U.S. faces considerable domestic pressure in maintaining its support for 
Pakistan without any apparent benefit to the U.S..  Pakistan, without any doubt, needs 
U.S. support, both for tackling the insurgencies within/without and keeping the country 
from becoming dysfunctional.  The U.S., on the other hand, also needs Pakistan for 
supporting its troops in Afghanistan and for keeping terrorism under check in the region.  
While there remains a need for both Pakistan and the U.S. to revisit their strategies and 
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priorities, enhancing economic support to Pakistan would not only lift the U.S. image 
within Pakistan but also curb extremism and bring stability in the region.  
A. SCOPE AND PURPOSE  
The scope of this longitudinal, single-case study research is three fold:  critically 
analyzing the cost of Pak-U.S. cooperation in the last 10 years (finances, economy, 
number of casualties, destruction, infrastructure, and long-term effects), gauging the 
effectiveness of the alliance in terms of achieving desired objectives, and 
examining/proposing ways and means to achieve a long-term strategic partnership. 
The purpose of the entire research is to understand the impact of the population-
centric approach, vis-a-vis the military approach, in forecasting and achieving the desired 
short/long term goals.  In other terms, the research would assist in finding ways and 
means to achieve a better return on the U.S. investment in Pakistan after evaluating 
Pakistan‘s true current capacity/capability and understanding its geo-political, socio-
cultural, and socio-economic limitations. Research would highlight the 
importance/impact of public opinion on the pattern of extremism and courses of action, 
specific to the Af-Pak region within the years 2001–2011.  Understanding the other 
variables, like better fund management, prioritization, micro alliances, accountability, and 
interest alignment, would help formulate a better strategy for the two key non-NATO 
allies to deal with such challenges in the future. 
B. THESIS QUESTION AND ITS IMPORTANCE 
A number of questions, with respect to the cost-benefit equation of the Pak-U.S. 
alliance in the war on terror, revolve around the pattern of U.S. investment in Pakistan.   
However, the main question for this research is ‗how to achieve a better return on the 
U.S. investments in Pakistan and enhance cost effectiveness in the ‗fight against 
terrorism‘?  We explore the possibility that a more balanced investment, with a 
population-centric approach along with decentralized disbursement through micro 
alliances, funding priorities, and better accountability of funds, based on perceived 
objectives, is likely to play a significant role in achieving desired objectives and pave the 
way for a long-term Pak-U.S. strategic relationship.  Analysis of this question will 
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provide context and focus to alliance efforts and enhance cost effectiveness in the global 
war on terror.  Answers to Pakistan specific questions may have direct/indirect impact on 
the strategic implications toward the U.S. in Afghanistan, Iraq and other areas with 
similar conditions. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
We plan to utilize a combination of methods to analyze the question of cost 
effectiveness.   However, we would primarily use longitudinal research through a single-
case study design to analyze total funds and their consumption vis-a-vis the 
success/failure to achieve objectives. This will be achieved by a systematic process 
tracing and examining fund expenditures incurred in the fight against terror during the 
last 10 years.  It includes identification and justification of the areas where the funds were 
under/over-utilized with respect to their intended purpose.  It also includes critical 
examination of military and nonmilitary expenditure and the contribution it made towards 
achieving the intended objectives. We will explore the population-centric investment and 
its influence on the outcome of the war by closely examining Pakistan‘s limitations, 
socio-political/economic conditions and security infrastructure.   
D. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
1. Dependent Variable (DV): Cost-Effectiveness/Return on Investment 
The major components of the dependent variable include indices of different 
funds, their utilization, effects created, contribution toward achievement of 
primary/secondary objectives and net cost-benefit assessment.  To measure the dependent 
variable, we will analyze various stability indexes from 2001 to 2010 to see if there has 
been an increase in these numbers.  Furthermore, we will compare strategic-level 
objectives, from the United States and Pakistan‘s perspectives, to measure the degree of 
success in achieving these objectives.  The relationship between the DV and the IVs is 




2. Independent Variables (IVs):   
(a) Balanced Investment (Mil vs. Non-Mil) 
(b) Effective Fund Management  
(c) Interest Alignment 
 








A balanced Investment with a population-centric approach in Pakistan is likely 
to contribute significantly in achieving both the short-term and long-term goals of the 
Pak-U.S. alliance in the WOT. 
The pattern of U.S. investments in Pakistan has remained ‗military-heavy‘ in the 
past.  A more population-centric investment would not only assist in supporting the weak 
socio-economic infrastructure but would also improve the U.S. perception in Pakistan.  
This would help isolate the extremists from the general population and bring favorable 
results in achieving both short- and long-term objectives of the two key allies. 
5. Hypothesis-2: 
Reforms in the existing fund management system along with decentralized 
disbursement, funding priorities, institutionalization, accountability of associated 
funds and formation of microalliances would not only help address the immediate 
issues but also assist in attaining long-term goals. 
The channelization of funds through reliable and credible institutions is the 
foundation stone to achieve cost effectiveness.  A check and balance procedure through 
accountability is the second and foremost step towards success.  The third step is to 
prioritize the spending of money in the sectors where it is most needed and where the 
U.S. will get the most out of her investments in terms of meeting strategic objectives.  
The areas that are most affected by terrorism take priority for rehabilitation over the 
others.  Decentralized disbursement of funds at the provincial level, and further 
decentralizing into various subsectors, would be effective in bringing substantial changes.  
Each sector and sub-sector should have centralized accountability at the USAID level.  
Besides development, it is evident that unemployment and illiteracy also fuel insurgency.  
Therefore, the strategy should be to wedge, contain or smother the effects of terrorism 





Promoting converging interests/common goals and removing misperceptions 
between the two allies would not only minimize the trust deficit but can also assist 
greatly in achieving desired alliance objectives. 
Pakistan has natural limitations due to its geographic and demographic location in 
the region; however, the priorities of the U.S. are directional and aligned to achieve its 
own objectives.  The repercussions of the alliance are evident with the emergence of 
terrorist organizations that are gravely damaging the socio-economic condition of 
Pakistan.   In order to balance the effects, U.S. economic aid was provided to skew the 
perceptions of the majority in favor of the common goals of the two allies.  However, the 
opposite effect has been achieved, with a common perception that this aid is nourishing 
corruption in the country.   The reason behind this notion is due to the fact that the funds 
are under-utilized or not accountable through any system or procedure.  There might be 
success in terms of achieving ―kill ratio‖ through more drone attacks, but the same is 
increasing sympathies in favor of the counter-state elements. 
In order to achieve alignment of interests, reduce the trust deficit and promote 
common goals of the two allies for laying the foundation of an enduring strategic 
partnership, three mechanisms/courses of action must be considered: 
a) Identification of existing common goals 
b) Prioritization of common goals in policies 
c) Convincing both allies to generate more common goals 
If the two allies are able to promote commonalities, understand each other‘s 
limitations, change their policies and approach the issues with converging interests, there 
is a likelihood of establishing a better relationship based on trust, needs, understanding 




E. RESEARCH OUTLINE 
1. Chapter I: Introduction 
2. Chapter II: Historical Perspective 
This chapter traces the historic relationship patterns of Pakistan and the U.S. and 
highlights the origins of alliances between the two partners. Later, it focuses on the Pak-
U.S. Alliance made after 9/11 to fight against terrorism, providing an overview of the 
alliance, its major nodes of cooperation and their value. 
3. Chapter III: Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The cost-benefit analysis, besides explaining the dependent variable, facilitates an 
understanding and selection of the criteria for judging the policy choices. This chapter 
takes into account the expenditures of the Pak-U.S. alliance since 2001, weighs them 
against the success or failure in achieving the set objectives and critically analyzes the 
cost-benefit equation for both allies in the ‗fight against terrorism‘.  The chapter also 
suggests the likely pattern of costs and associated benefits for the U.S. and touches upon 
Pakistan‘s perspective and limitations.  
4. Chapter IV: Effective Fund Management 
This chapter discusses the significance of a ‗balanced investment (military/non-
military)‘ and highlights the deficiencies of existing fund management. It suggests ways 
like decentralized disbursement, micro-alliances, prioritization, channelization, 
accountability and entrepreneurship to make fund management more effective.  While 
several options for effective fund utilization  will be discussed in this chapter, 
institutionalization of funds poses a challenge to the government in the absence of 
credible economic institutions.  
5. Chapter V: Game Theoretical Model 
This chapter deals with the game theoretical modeling, keeping CSF and ESF as 
the main parameters for establishing a relationship between security-related investments 
and economic-related investments.  Modeling will be done, keeping in mind the effects 
produced by the U.S. investments from the year 2001 to 2011, to clarify the difference of 
 8 
the two approaches, their applicability in specific regions and long-term benefits.  
Analysis drawn from the modeling will form the basis for further discussion of 
population-centric versus military investments in Pakistan. 
6. Chapter VI: Perception and Realities 
This chapter examines two of the most fundamental and conceptual elements of 
Pak-U.S. relations. First, conflicting interests will be highlighted with their implications 
for the relationship. Second, the perception of both countries about each other will be 
weighed against realities on the ground.  This chapter also discusses improving public 
opinion through a developmental strategy and the population-centric approach.  
7. Chapter VII: Conclusion and the Way Ahead 
The youth of Pakistan is developing a favorable impression of terrorism and 
nurturing anti-U.S. sentiments.   This may be termed as a ―weak win‖ situation, one that 
favors the political success of the governments of both countries, but at the expense of the 
long-term strategic relationship.  The understanding of each other‘s limitations through 
dialogue and discussions could not bring solutions.   Practical measures through 
education, health care, trade and employment would restore confidence and bring about 
changes in the general perception of local people in the country.   
One side of the picture, the U.S. is carrying out negotiations with the Taliban with 
a perception that they have separated themselves from al Qaeda, and on the other side the 
U.S. is insisting and pressuring Pakistan to carry out military operations in North 
Waziristan to eliminate the sanctuaries of Taliban.  Who is responsible for the 
consequences of this action?  How would Pakistan justify its military strategies to the 
population?  What impression would carry over to future generations about the U.S.?  It 
is therefore imperative that the objectives of both countries be in alignment and 
consonant with measurable factors, because the mistakes of today should be corrected 
before they become blunders in history. 
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The early years of the Cold War witnessed the partition of the Indian 
subcontinent, creating Pakistan and India as separate states.  The global strategic events 
that followed forced both India and Pakistan to forge alliances after 1947 with contending 
superpowers due to their inherent ideological differences.  While India preferred to join 
the USSR camp, Pakistan chose to align with the west in general and the U.S. in 
particular.  This alliance resulted in Pak-U.S. military cooperation and a broader Pak-U.S. 
understanding on other forms of cooperation.  The historic Pak-U.S. alliance can be 
divided into three distinct phases: the Cold War from 1950–1960, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in the 1980s and, most recently, the Global War on Terrorism.  There is also 
a phase of alliance with China and friction with the U.S. during the mid-60s.  The wide 
gaps between the phases represent epochs of cold relations between the two states due to 
various geo-strategic and national interests, summarized in the following paragraphs. 
A. PHASE 1 
In 1950, Liaquat Ali Khan turned down an invitation to visit Moscow, choosing to 
visit the United States instead.  During this phase, the Government of the United States 
was promoting its national interest by maintaining peace in the South Asia region, 
especially by the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan. Pakistan re-
affirmed its dedication to the alliance when the United States promised that, in 
accordance with the Constitution, it would take appropriate action to promote peace and 
combat the spread of communism in the Middle East and South Asia (with special 
reference to Pakistan).1  The United States reaffirmed its support of Pakistan against any 
attack, including from India.2   
 The Cold War Pakistan-United States alliance promoted world peace 
instead of communist aggression and upgraded the defense capabilities of Pakistan 
                                                 
1 Farhat Mahmud, A History of U.S.-Pakistan Relations (Lahore: Vanguard, 1991). 
2 The U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, ―Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1961–1963. Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,‖ Volume XIX, South Asia, 
Document 328 (Tehran, September 5, 1963), accessed on October 18, 2011. 
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against all aggression, including the potential threat from India.3  The neighboring 
countries (India, USSR and China) felt threatened by this bilateral agreement.  Both 
countries benefited from the arrangement; military assistance flowed to Pakistan and the 
U.S. gained access to the air bases in the then North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and 
now Khaibar Pakhtoonkhwa (KP) with which to monitor/spy on Russian military 
research centers.  According to President Eisenhower, Pakistan became ―America‘s most 
allied ally in Asia.‖4 Eisenhower became the first U.S. President to visit Pakistan in 1959, 
where Ayub Khan shared his concerns regarding the United States‘ military aid to India 
posing a serious threat to Pakistan.5  It would be worthwhile to state that the policies of 
the military Government of president Ayub Khan during 1958–60 were out rightly pro-
western/American.6 
Origin of Alliance with China and Friction with the U.S. The U.S. policy 
toward the Asian region began to change when Kennedy supported India in its third five-
year plan, despite the fact that Pakistan was the only Asian country that was a member of 
both the SEATO and CENTO pacts.  Ayub Khan aired his concerns regarding U.S.-India 
cooperation (beyond the visible bilateral support) and its impact on Pakistan.  He also 
said: ―If India became too powerful, its smaller neighbors would have to seek China‘s 
protection and China could not reject for providing protection.‖7  The U.S. viewed 
Pakistan as a new Cold War ally.  This can be gauged from the fact that $508 million of 
U.S. military aid flowed into Pakistan between 1953 and 1961.8  On 13 October 1962, in 
a meeting between the foreign minister of Pakistan and the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean 
                                                 
3 Muhammad Iqbal and Samia Khalid, ―Pakistan‘s Relations with the United States during Ayub 
Khan‘s Period,‖ 3, no. Number 1 (2011), 14–123, accessed September 12, 2011, 
http://www.pakistaniaat.org/article/download/8277/5863. 13. 
4K. Alan Kronstadt, Library of Congress and Congressional Research Service, ―Pakistan-U.S. 
Relations,‖ Congressional Research Service, accessed September 12, 2011, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf. 
5 Iqbal and Khalid, Pakistan‘s Relations with the United States during Ayub Khan‘s Period, 14. 
6 W. M. Dobell, ―Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan,‖ Pacific Affairs 42, no. 3 (Autumn, 1969), pp. 
294–310. 
7  S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, 2nd ed. 
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 498. 
8 Kronstadt, Library of Congress and Congressional Research Service, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, 102. 
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Rusk said that ―the Kashmir problem was irrational and one that had cost Pakistan and 
India a great deal of money and development.  We cannot stake our entire policy in Asia 
on the settlement of Kashmir.‖9  On 27 October 1962 Kennedy informed Ayub Khan 
about his wish that Pakistan should help India in the Sino-Indian war of 1962.  President 
Ayub Khan refrained attacking the Chinese border to help India.  
Pakistan signed a border agreement with China on 29 March 1963, along with 
other agreements including security and mutual trade.  After these agreements, the 
American response towards the Kashmir dispute became indifference, as the United 
States wanted to strengthen India as a regional ally against China.  On 11 August 1963, 
Kennedy said, ―We are conditioned by our history. I can well understand your reaction to 
our extending military aid to India, but allowance must be made for the special 
circumstances which occasioned our assistance.‖10  After the Sino-Pak Agreement on 29 
August 1963, the Kennedy Administration responded by imposing a restriction on 
Pakistan for the first time, postponing a $4.3 million loan to build a new airport at 
Dacca11 (East Pakistan), from which Pakistan International Airline was to launch a flight 
to China. This was a silent protest by America.12 Then, a meeting was held from 3–6t 
September 1963, between American and Pakistani secretaries. President Ayub Khan 
delivered a speech in which he clarified that, ―American aid to India is a main cause for 
the increased Indian threat to Pakistan. We want to normalize our relations with 
neighboring countries India, China and also USSR.‖13  This was the beginning period of 
Pakistan‘s multilateral policy with all the neighboring countries.  Ayub Khan visited 
China in March 1965 and USSR in April 1965.  Pakistan‘s relationship with the United 
States reached its lowest ebb when President Johnson cancelled Ayub Khan‘s visit to 
Washington in April 1965.  A few weeks later, he also stopped Pakistan‘s funds for the 
                                                 
9 Iqbal and Khalid, Pakistan‘s Relations with the United States during Ayub Khan‘s Period, 14–123. 
10Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy,1947- 2005: A Concise History (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 329. 
11 After Indo-Pak war of 1971 it became a new state, which is now Bangladesh. 
12Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 470–470. 
13Ibid. 
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third five-year plan.  During the Indo-Pak war in 1965, the United States stopped the 
supply of weapons for both India and Pakistan.14  
There were many advantages accrued to Pakistan because of its alliance with the 
United States. In terms of the badly needed military hardware, the total assistance 
extended to Pakistan from 1954 to 1965 amounted to between 650 million U.S. dollars.15 
The economic assistance in the form of Public Law, agricultural commodity programs, 
grants for economic developments, technical assistance development grants, and loans of 
various kinds were much higher. ―Over the period from 1947 through June 30, 1965, 
economic assistance of this nature amounted to $3 billion.‖16 
In 1971, the newly elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, Z. A. Bhutto, re-evaluated 
the nature of Pak-U.S. relations.  He explained the re-evaluation of mutual relations in 
terms of change in factual conditions and geopolitical realities.
17 
 After the Indo-Pak war 
in 1971, Pakistan realized that the U.S. support for India was meant to contain China and 
there would be no support for Pakistan against any Indian aggression.  Therefore, 
Pakistan withdrew from SEATO in 1972 and CENTO in 1979, and joined the Non-
Aligned Movement.
18
  In 1976, Pak-U.S. relations once again became strained over the 
acquisition of a nuclear processing plant.  This was caused by India‘s 1974 successful 
nuclear detonation, which invigorated Pakistan‘s insecurity syndrome.19  Pakistan signed 
an agreement with France for the acquisition of the nuclear processing plant in 1976.20  
The relations between the Bhutto regime and the U.S. administration worsened after 
Pakistan finalized the nuclear deal.  ―President Carter‘s administration was publicly 
                                                 
14Peter R. Blood, Pakistan: a Country Study , Edition: 6th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research 
Division, Library of Congress, 1995), 398. 
15 Mussarat Jabeen and Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, ―Security Game: SEATO and CENTO as 
Instrument of Economic and Military Assistance to Encircle Pakistan,‖ Pakistan Economic and Social 
Review 49, no. 1 (Summer, 2011), 109–132. 119. 
16 Safdar Sial, ―Pak-U.S. A Balance Sheet of Relations,‖ Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (June 26, 






hostile to the Bhutto regime‘s insistence on pursuing a nuclear option.‖21 In July 1977, a 
military dictator, General Zia Ul Haq, overthrew the Bhutto regime.  However, it is not 
very clear whether the U.S. was behind such a drastic change of regime.22 
B. PHASE 2 
The second major phase of Pak-U.S. bilateral relations began after the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Once again, this partnership highlighted the 
common interest of Pakistan and the United States for the establishment of peace and 
stability in South Asia.  The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan adversely affected the 
interests of both Pakistan and the U.S. in two ways. First, the invasion could be seen as 
the initial step on a drive for warm water access through Pakistan. Second, it meant the 
expansion of communism in south Asia.  Supporting Pakistan to pre-empt the threat was 
the only available solution to the problem.  Therefore, the U.S. Congress in 1981 
authorized a $3.2 billion five-year aid package to Pakistan, including 40 F-16 aircraft, in 
order to strengthen Pakistan‘s security to counter this growing threat.23 President Reagan 
guaranteed to provide additional financial support of $4 billion for the next five years 
(1987–1993) and exempted Pakistan from the Symington and Glenn Amendments24 for a 
period of 6 years ending in 1987.25 ―In exchange, Pakistan served as a channel for covert 
U.S. military aid to Afghan rebel forces, the Mujahedeen, fighting the Soviet occupation 
army.‖26 
A second multiyear economic development and security assistance program 
between both the countries commenced in March 1986. However, the security dynamics 
changed after Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in response to India in 1998.  The United 
States suspended all military assistance and new economic aid under the Pressler 
                                                 
21 Sial, ―Pak-U.S. A Balance Sheet of Relations.‖ 
22 Lawrence Ziring, ―Pakistan and India: Politics, Personalities, and Foreign Policy,‖ Asian Survey 18, 
no. 7 (July 1978), 706–730. 
23 Sial, ―Pak-U.S. A Balance Sheet of Relations.‖ 
24 An act for the sanctions against countries that acquire or transfer nuclear reprocessing technology or 
explode or transfer a nuclear device. 
25 Ibid., 4–5. 
26 Ibid., 5. 
 14 
Amendment in 1990.27 The Pressler Amendment required the President to certify 
annually that Pakistan ―does not possess a nuclear explosive device.‖28  Issues related to 
nuclear proliferation and regional security raised the concerns of the U.S. in that region.  
A number of dialogues were initiated, focusing on signing CTBT and ratification, FMCT 
negotiations, export controls, and a nuclear restraint regime.29  An additional burden of 
sanctions was imposed when General Pervez Musharraf overthrew Nawaz Sharif‘s 
government.   
C. PHASE 3 
The Pak-U.S. relationship, in decline after the Soviet war, regained strength after 
the 9/11 fiasco.  During the Musharraf regime, Pakistan moved decisively to ally itself 
with the United States in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).  Pakistan provided the U.S. 
with access to a number of military air bases and corridors to attack al Qaeda and Taliban 
strongholds in Afghanistan and terrorist sanctuaries inside Pakistan.  Being a vital non-
NATO ally of the U.S. Pakistan accrued various monetary benefits.  Following are the 
broad areas that instituted the beginning of bilateral affairs between the U.S. and Pakistan 
after 9/11: 
1. Suppress and defeat religious Islamic extremism in the Af-Pak region 
through enhanced Interoperability in the global war on terrorism. 
2. Supporting Pakistan to boost its economy, help social development and 
bring political stability in the country. 
3. Foster mutual understanding and bridge ideological differences between 
the people of the U.S. and Pakistan.  
Due to its strategic and geo-political location, Pakistan became one of the United 
States‘ most valuable partners in its GWOT.  The governments of the two countries 
worked closely to dismantle, defeat and neutralize the al Qaeda leadership and its strong 
networks in the Af-Pak region. Both countries collaborated in the fields of military/non-
                                                 
27 Economic and military sanctions were imposed under the Pressler Amendment in October 1990. 
28 Ibid., 6. 
29 Ibid. 
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military intelligence, law enforcement, finance, and joint operational training.  Many 
overt and covert operations against al Qaeda elements and its leadership were conducted 
inside Pakistan. The Pakistani military authorities successfully apprehended well over 
600 al Qaeda suspects and Taliban operatives.30  ―Major battles with militants have 
concentrated on several fronts: the Swat valley, and the Bajaur, South Waziristan, and 
Mohmand tribal agencies.‖31 Pakistan is also bearing a major share of the human cost of 
fighting the war on terror.   More than 3,500 of its military officers and soldiers have 
been killed in various operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban inside Pakistan. The 
Pakistan military has deployed up to 150,000 regular and paramilitary troops to its 
western borders in response to the upwelling violence there.32  
In pursuit of the U.S. objectives in South Asia, the existing phase of Pak-U.S. 
bilateral relations has a strategic depth greater than in the past. ―The new geo-strategic 
realities like nuclear South Asia, energy security, counter-terrorism regime and economic 
pursuits (especially trade liberalism)‖33 cannot abate the significance of Pakistan in the 
regional and global politics. Since 2001, the U.S. has provided Pakistan with more than 
$11 billion in military aid, mainly intended to combat terrorism.34 The Enhanced 
Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA), popularly known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill 
(KLB) after its sponsors in the U.S. Senate, was signed into law by President Obama in 
October 2009.  The EPPA was designed to triple the amount of U.S. aid to Pakistan to 
$1.5 billion per year for five years.  The purpose was to align that aid more closely with 
U.S. and Pakistani priorities, and impose new accountability mechanisms to reduce the 
chances that aid might be diverted from its intended use.35 
                                                 
30 Economic and military sanctions were imposed under the Pressler Amendment in October 1990. 
31 Susan B. Epstein et al., ―Pakistan U.S. Foreign Assistance,‖ Congressional Research Service, 
Library of Congress, http://www.cq.com/pdf/crsreports-3886786; Note: Go to CQ.com and search for all 
releases of this CRS report. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Sial, ―Pak-U.S. A Balance Sheet of Relations,‖ August 11, 2011–8. 
34 R. Banerji, ―They all Fall Down,‖ Hindustan Times (March 17, 2011), August 12, 2011. 
35 Robert D. Lamb, ―Governance and Militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan,‖ CSIS (May 2011), 
http://csis.org/files/publication/110616_Lamb_Exec_Sum.pdf, accessed on June 20, 2011–18. 11. 
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Nevertheless, the political turmoil inside Afghanistan has an active or passive 
connection to its geographical neighbor Pakistan, and vice-versa.  It is pertinent to 
highlight that Pakistan also has its own geo-strategic, security and economic concerns.  A 
more comprehensive, democratic and political strategic advancement of policy options is 
required in the region.  Due to geo-political significance, the ongoing U.S.-India 
relationship on various issues needs to be viewed as a separate entity. Historically, the 
problems in Pak-U.S. relations arose after the U.S. foreign policy for India began to run 
in parallel to its political interests with Pakistan. The United States has favored 
reconciliation and wanted harmony in Indo-Pak relations, as it is vital for stability in the 
region.  This is a time of great opportunity for India and Pakistan to reconcile and 
develop understandings over the petty disputes that are the major cause of instability in 
the region.36 
The Pak-U.S. relationship has entered into an extremely complex stage after the 
operation ‗Neptune Spear‘ (the killing of Osama bin Laden), the case of Raymond Davis, 
and other events of the same nature have deepened the apparent trust deficit between the 
two allies.   Nevertheless, changes to U.S. policy, particularly on security cooperation and 
foreign aid, have aligned the U.S. activities and programs more closely with strategic 
imperatives and local realities than they had been before 2009.  However, these new 
policies and programs are at their initial stages of implementation, and progress is 
expected to be subtle.  It is unlikely, for example, that the United States can play anything 
more than a catalytic role in improving Pakistan‘s capacity for stabilization.  Progress 
may be difficult but not impossible or unlikely because a majority of the people in both 
countries desires progress in the relations.   Similarly, EPPA programs have a chance of 
making small but effective contributions to both Pakistani governance capacity and the 
Pak-U.S. relationship.   Regardless of the complexity and declining nature of the 
relations, the benefits of continuing the relationship (through renewed measures) 
definitely outweigh the consequences of disengagement at this juncture.37 
                                                 
36 Sial, Pak-U.S. A Balance Sheet of Relations, August 11, 2011–8. 
37 Lamb, Governance and Militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, June 20, 2011, 11–12. 
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The United States has a limited influence within the institutions of Pakistan. The 
bilateral engagement paves the way for the American access to Pakistani decision 
makers. There are ample examples where cooperation, including intelligence sharing and 
counterterrorism operations, produced fruitful results.  The development projects and 
military training give Americans and Pakistanis an opportunity to work together in 
fostering trust.  These measures build capacity and professionalism and expose some 
Pakistanis to American values—such as civilian control over the military.  
Disengagement during the 1990s, for example, blocked an entire generation of 
Pakistani military officers from receiving the U.S. training that would have exposed them 
to a strong military institution with the restraint and confidence to submit to civilian rule; 
it would have exposed them as well to critical thinking, the laws of war, human rights, 
and the protection of civilians, in addition to basic and advanced war fighting. Within 
Pakistan‘s security institutions today, there is a growing need to reform, modernize, and 
professionalize. Maintaining or deepening military-to-military engagement would help 
the United States to assist that notion and help to change at least some of the more 
hardline views within the security establishment. Maintaining or deepening involvement 
in development and prudence would also support those professionals and moderates 
within the Pakistani government and civil service who want Pakistan to be—and to be 
viewed internationally as—a responsible state; to disengage now would be to abandon 
them, which obviously is not in the U.S. interest.38 
No matter how far technology progresses, the importance of human intelligence 
could not be denied.  It is the need of the hour for all the U.S. counterterrorism (CT) 
efforts in the region.  Making gaps in the relations or disengagement would make all CT 
efforts futile and put further constraints on the potential for recruiting human intelligence. 
Historically, Pakistan‘s problems are reflected in a cultural significance of powerlessness 
or degradation, especially with regards to India.  
Given the relative strength of India‘s military, size of its population, and 
strength of its economy, it should not come as a surprise that Pakistan 
would develop nuclear weapons, use irregular forces as a proxy army, and 
                                                 
38 Lamb, Governance and Militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, June 20, 2011, 11–12. 
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seek as much military hardware and training as possible. Publicly 
criticizing Pakistan for engaging in (strategically rational) asymmetric 
behaviors serves mainly to remind Pakistanis of their strategically 
vulnerable—and humiliating—position with respect to India, and thereby 
helps elevate the profile, resolve, and influence of Pakistani hardliners. A 
constructive relationship with the United States—one in which Pakistanis 
are conspicuously treated with respect, privately discouraged from the 
destructive policies of hardliners, and otherwise empowered to protect and 
serve their own citizens as well as possible—could serve to moderate this 
dynamic. An angry disengagement, as seems to be the direction the public 
conversation about U.S.-Pakistan relations is going, would only contribute 
to the vicious cycle of humiliation and hardliner response.39 
D. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF U.S. AID 
 Ever since the creation of Pakistan on the global map and its alliance towards the 
west, the United States has provided aid to Pakistan in order to achieve its foreign policy 
objectives.  There has been fluctuation in the relations for many reasons.  ―In some years, 
U.S. aid would support balance in the region and contain Soviet expansionism; in other 
years, the U.S. government would withhold aid because of nuclear weapons proliferation 
and lack of democratization gains.‖40 The lowest ebb of the U.S. aid to Pakistan came 
after the withdrawal of Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989 on the premise of 
Pakistan‘s nuclear activities that were made to surface after the U.S. had its objectives 
achieved.  Figure 2 depicts the trend of Pak-U.S. relations, in terms of financial 
assistance, since 1947. 
                                                 
39 Lamb, Governance and Militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, June 20, 2011, 11–12. 
40 Epstein et al., Pakistan U.S. Foreign Assistance. 
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Figure 2. The U.S. financial assistance to Pakistan since 1947 
 
The public perception of the Pakistani people of the U.S. as an unreliable ally 
initially arose after the U.S. imposed sanctions on Pakistan and India after the Indo-Pak 
wars of 1965 and 1971.  When combined with ensuing restrictions on U.S. aid, this left 
many Pakistanis with the sense they had been ―used and ditched.‖41  After 2001, the 
lowest ebb of Pak-U.S. relations could be marked after the operation Neptune Spear.  
―Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gillani‘s May 2011 state visit to Beijing was 
viewed by many as an implicit response to a recent deterioration in U.S.-Pakistan ties.‖42  
The next chapter takes into account the aid and its effects from 2001 to 2010. 
 
 
                                                 
41 Pervez Musharraf, ADDRESS: His Excellency Pervez Musharraf at Royal United Services Institute, 
online, 2008, http://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E4794DB1E93E7C/, accessed on August 10, 2011. 
42 Christopher Bodeen, ―Pakistan‘s Gilani Visits Ally Beijing Amid U.S. Rift,‖ Associated Press 
(May 17, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/may/17/pakistans-gilani-visits-ally-beijing-
amid-us-rift/, accessed on May 21, 2011. 
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III. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
This chapter takes into account the expenditure incurred by the Pak-U.S. alliance 
from 2002 to 2011 and weighs it against the success or failure in achieving the set 
objectives by critically analyzing the cost-benefit equation for both the allies engaged in 
the ‗fight against terrorism‘.  The chapter also suggests the likely future patterns of costs 
and associated benefits for the U.S. and hints at Pakistan‘s perspective and limitations. 
A. U.S. AID REVIEW 2002–2010 
The United States has provided more than $10.58 billion to Pakistan since 
September 2001, under various headings including, but not limited to, Coalition Support, 
Security, and Economic Support. U.S. aid to Pakistan registered a sharp rise after the 
events of September 11, 2001.  Thereafter, during the period from 2002 to 2011, the U.S. 
aid was raised many times under various heads including:  Counter-Narcotics, Coalition 
Support, Child Survival and Health, Development Assistance, Economic Support, FC 
Train and Equipment, Foreign Military Financing, Human Rights and Democracy, 
International Disaster Assistance, International Military Education and Training, 
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, Migration and Refugee 
Assistance, Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related, Pakistan 
Counterinsurgency and Counterinsurgency Capability.  
The 2010 U.S. aid to Pakistan of some $4,462 million represents an increase of 
121% when compared to the pre-9/11 level in FY2001, making Pakistan second among 
U.S. aid recipients, after Afghanistan and before Israel.43   The direct overt U.S. aid and 





                                                 
43 Bodeen, ―Pakistan‘s Gilani Visits Ally Beijing Amid U.S. Rift,‖ accessed on May 21, 2011, 8–9. 
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1206: Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2006 (P.L. 109–163, global train and 
equip) 
CN: Counternarcotics Funds (Pentagon budget) 
CSF: Coalition Support Funds (Pentagon budget) 
CSH: Child Survival and Health (Global Health and Child Survival, or GHCS, from FY2010) 
DA: Development Assistance 
ESF: Economic Support Funds 
FC: Section 1206 of the NDAA for FY2008 (P.L. 110–181, Pakistan Frontier Corp train and equip) 
FMF: Foreign Military Financing 
HRDF: Human Rights and Democracy Funds 
IDA: International Disaster Assistance (Pakistani earthquake and internally displaced persons relief) 
IMET: International Military Education and Training 
INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (includes border security) 
MRA: Migration and Refugee Assistance 
NADR: Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related (the majority allocated for Pakistan is for anti-
terrorism assistance) 
PCF/PCCF: Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund/Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (transferred to State Department 
oversight in FY2010) 
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1. Coalition Support Funds (CSF) 
The majority of funds allocated to Pakistan were placed under two major heads: 
the Coalition Support and Economic Support Funds. The Coalition Support Funds were 
designed to compensate Pakistan and other nations for their operational and logistical 
support of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations.
44
  These funds alone have accounted for 
nearly half of U.S. financial transfers to Pakistan since 2001.  Some $8.9 billion had been 
disbursed as of May 2011, an amount equal to roughly one-fifth to one-quarter of 
Pakistan‘s total military expenditures during this period.   CSF payments have been used 
to support many scores of Pakistani military operations and help to keep more than 
100,000 Pakistani troops in the field in northwest Pakistan by paying for their food, 




2. Economic Support Funds (ESF) 
The second major head under the U.S. assistance to Pakistan is the ‗Economic 
Support Funds‘.  The United States provides bilateral economic, development, and 
humanitarian assistance to Pakistan through a number of funding accounts, as depicted in 
Table 1.   Often, funds within ESF are transferred to International Disaster Assistance 
(IDA) or Migration and Refuge Assistance (MRA) for emergency assistance, such as in 
response to the Pakistan flood crisis during 2010.46 In FY2009 and FY2010, ESF funds 
reflected about 80% of U.S. economic assistance to Pakistan, with the above-noted 
accounts making up the remaining 20% (Table 1). 
Some of the increase in ESF funding, from FY2009 - FY2010, were the 
supplemental appropriations passed by Congress.  ESF is used to fund a wide array of 
activities. In Pakistan, the program is used to help establish political parties and bolster 
Pakistan‘s ability to conduct elections; help the government provide services to its 
citizens; promote the delivery of health-related technologies; provide basic education 
                                                 
44 Bodeen, ―Pakistan‘s Gilani Visits Ally Beijing Amid U.S. Rift,‖ accessed on May 21, 2011, 15. 
45 Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 6, 2008. 
46 Ibid., 9. 
 24 
support and improve the quality of universities in Pakistan.  ESF funds also provide help 
for the government of Pakistan to pursue economic reforms, such as improving tax 
collection, strengthening border management, and building infrastructure.  ESF aims at 
promoting agriculture, which is a key component of job growth in rural districts, and 
supports linkages between farmers, markets, and business service providers to increase 
access to modern farm equipment. ESF also promotes private-sector competitiveness to 
strengthen the business community, create jobs, and expand the economy.47  However, 
the small percentage of funds dedicated to carrying out all these activities is grossly 
insufficient and lacks both the additional funds and clarity of purpose, besides the true 
objectives, of both the donor and the receiver. 
B. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
We have considered the two highest funded programs, Coalition Support Funds 
(CSF) and Economic Support Funds (ESF), for the cost-benefit analysis on the U.S. aid 
to Pakistan from the year 2001 to 2010.  These programs are the major heads of the direct 
overt U.S. aid provided to Pakistan and constitute 70% of the total funds.  After listing 
the tangible monetary costs for cooperation, a list of intangible and tangible benefits for 
both security and economic aid will follow.   
Some Pakistanis and Americans saw the United States‘ killing of Osama bin 
Laden in Pakistan as treachery, which further fueled the feeling of distrust between both 
countries.  Pakistanis considered the raid an infringement on their sovereignty and the 
U.S. saw Pakistan as a collaborator of Bin Laden.  What will happen to the foreign aid 
flowing from the United States into Pakistan remains to be seen, but the question is: with 
the cost of $3.1 billion for fiscal year 2011 is the United States reaping any benefits from 
this foreign aid? 48  Some experts might argue that the United States needs Pakistan in its 
fight against terrorism.  Furthermore, it must support the country‘s development as a 
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stable state.  Pessimists say that if the United States does not intervene in Pakistan, the 
country could descend into certain turmoil and continue to grow as a terrorism safe place.    
One of the cost-to-benefit success stories in the U.S. engagement with Pakistan is 
the successful drone strikes that have killed a large number of high value Al Qaeda 
targets.    However, some may consider these tactical victories small in comparison with 
the high political costs of these drone strikes that might unite various militant groups 
against the U.S. and the Pakistani government.49  Calling these drone strikes a success 
shows how there has been a ―securitization‖ of aid instead of a people-centric approach to 
foreign aid.  Even though the Kerry-Lugar-Berman was mostly a bipartisan U.S. 
commitment of foreign aid assistance to Pakistan, with a sharp increase in Economic 
Related Expenditures (ERF) in comparison with Security Related Expenditures (SRF), 
there is certain unease with the capacity of USAID and the DOS to efficiently administer 
and account for this substantial increase in assistance.50  Only time will tell if this spike 
in people-centric investment will result in a higher benefit-to-cost ratio. 
The exact definition of what constitutes ―costs‖ and ―benefits‖ will likely vary for 
all the different stakeholders involved in the foreign aid that is going into Pakistan.  
Furthermore, with the high levels of foreign aid given to Pakistan it is difficult to explain 
that the country ranks number 12 in the failed state index, even though last year it ranked 
number 10.51  In the research for this thesis, most of the tangible benefits for the U.S. 
alliance with Pakistan have been seen in the security realm, for example in the use of 
bases and over-flight rights and also with the successful drone strikes in Pakistan.   
In contrast, the CIA World Factbook shows that the Pakistani population has not 
been benefiting from the flow of foreign aid going into the country.  In dealing with 
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Pakistan, a country with the sixth largest population in the world, a literacy rate of less 
than 50 percent, and an annual per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $2,500, it is 
critical that the U.S. finds more innovative ways of disbursing foreign aid to influence the 
population—which is the base of power and legitimacy for the Pakistani government.52 
Key facts on Pakistan are presented in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Pakistan Fact Sheet 
 
Even though there is consensus within the U.S. government that the funds flowing 
into Pakistan have not been used effectively, there is no consensus as to what the root 
cause of the problem in Pakistan is and how to fix aid disbursement to make it more 
efficient.  To find feasible solutions for the disbursement of foreign aid going into 
Pakistan, a systems thinking approach and a causal loop diagram will help understand the 
behavior of the current foreign aid structure and how to make it more effective.  Aid to 
Pakistan since 2001 is summarized in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. U.S. Aid to Pakistan  
 
Social and security problems in Pakistan have correlation with United States 
security objectives; this is why Pakistan has received $13,676 million combined between 
CSF and ESF from 2001–2010.  The graph shows that there has been a steady increase 
since 2001 in ESF, which could be considered long-term assistance programs that should 
reap benefits if these funds are properly invested.  To show the tipping of the scale from 
CSF to ESF, in 2002 CSF to Pakistan totaled $1,169 million and ESF totaled $625 
million compared to 2010 in which CSF totaled $1,499 million and ESF was $1,292 
million.  This is a 28% increase in military-related spending compared to a 106% 
increase in economic development aid.  Even though this has been a step in the right 
direction, the total CSF from 2001 to 2010 has been $8,881 million compared to $4,785 
million for ESF, which is 85% more on the military/security spending when compared to 
the more population-centric approach.  
A population-centric approach to aid will not eliminate poverty or extend health 
















populace by legitimizing the government, promoting pro-American objectives and, most 
importantly, isolating extremists from the population, thus denying safe haven to these 
destructive groups. 
What have been the benefits in relation to the cost (foreign aid)?  In terms of 
military benefits for the United States, these will be measured in terms of successful 
drone strikes, overt/covert military operations against Al Qaeda/Taliban strongholds, 
combined military operations within Pakistan, and special operations against key Al 
Qaeda operatives.  The benefits in economic aid will be measured with key indicators 
like education, GDP, and public opinion.   
1. Military Aid Benefits 











Figure 5. Drone strikes in Pakistan 
    
 b. Pakistan cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. 
 c. Killing of Osama bin Laden. 
 d. Much needed funding for the Pakistan military in FATA region.  
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The U.S. has also benefited from the costs of CSF by using supply routes through 
Pakistan to support coalition troops in Afghanistan.  Consequently, this gives the military 
an advantage by saving time and significant cost compared to using other avenues of 
logistics distribution.  Similarly, Pakistanis have benefited from U.S. training to the 
frontier corps units deployed in the FATA and other trouble spots, but the country has 
paid a heavy price of cooperation in terms of loss of life and the rise of domestic 
terrorism.  Even though there is no way of calculating the cost of human lives, the 
destruction of social capital can be compensated by adopting the population-centric 
approach of providing more economic aid than military aid. 
2. Economic Aid Benefits 
The benefits of economic aid have not been tangible and are almost negligible.  
Pakistan‘s improvement challenge is significant and was worsened by the unprecedented 
floods in July 2010.  Pakistan ranks 125 out of 169 countries in the UN Human 
Development Index.53  About 33% of the population lives on less than $1 a day and 
almost a quarter of the population is underfed.   
Education in Pakistan is among the lowest in South Asia.  Gender inequality in 
access to schools, limited access to education in remote and ungoverned areas, lack of 
sufficient infrastructure, and inferiority of teaching support are general challenges in 
education.  Furthermore, almost half of the population is illiterate.  The 2010 flooding 
was a blow to education, damaging over 8,000 of the already poorly financed schools 
across the country.54 
It is difficult to quantify government performance in the case of Pakistan.  
However, governance has proved to be inefficient in law enforcement, urban 
development, and other socio-economic areas; this is complicated by high levels of 
corruption, to include mismanagement of funds.  In order for the enabling conditions to 
be met Pakistan, must invest in infrastructure, and economically self-sustaining 
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enterprises.  Furthermore, a synchronized joint venture between the government, private 
sector, NGOs and the population should be achieved to enhance the effectiveness of 
foreign aid.    
One of the tangible benefits of U.S. foreign aid on the economic front have been 
the emergency relief efforts after the natural disasters that have ravaged Pakistan in the 
last couple of years.  However, these have been reactive and not proactive in nature.  The 
following is a grouping of interrelated and interdependent components that form the 
complex system of foreign aid in Pakistan and a systems thinking approach to make 
economic-related support more effective.   
C. SYSTEMS THINKING APPROACH 
The formulation of the problem is that foreign aid is not helping bring governance 
to the recipient government‘s country.  Grievances of the population are not being met 
because the money is not getting to the people.  ESF might not be enough but if the funds 
are managed correctly, these could have a positive impact on the population.  These 
significant variables to explore all interact within the complex system as depicted in 
Figure 6: 
• Foreign Aid - Defined as economic assistance provided by one nation to 
another 
• Corruption - Corruption in Pakistan is a substantial obstacle and is still 
perceived to be pervasive and general55 
• Grievances - A cause of distress (could be lack of basic needs) felt to 
afford reason for complaint or resistance56 
• Security - Degree of protection against danger, damage, loss or criminal 
activity57  
                                                 
55 Marie Chêne, Craig Fagan and Sylwia Plaza, ―Overview of Corruption in Pakistan,‖ Transparency 
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56 Webster’s Dictionary of English Usage, (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, 1989), 11, 978. 
57 Ibid. 
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• Military Spending - CSF 
• Non-Military Spending - ESF 
• Social Entrepreneurship - A social entrepreneur recognizes a social 
problem and uses entrepreneurial principles to organize, create and 
manage a venture to achieve social change (a social venture)58 
• Alternative Sources - Foreign investment instead of aid 
 
Figure 6. Systems Thinking Approach  
 
This causal loop diagram explains how the different variables interrelate with 
each other and the cause and effect relationships within the system.  The S indicates a 
change in the same direction, for example ―as corruption goes up, grievances also go up.‖  
The O signifies that there is a change in opposite direction, for example ―as grievances go 
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up, security goes down.‖  The R indicates that the diagram is a reinforcing loop that 
compounds change in one direction with more change in the same direction.  This is 
known as a vicious or virtuous cycle.59 
As foreign aid goes up, corruption within the receiving government goes up with 
the availability of funds.  As corruption goes up, with the dwindling availability of funds, 
the grievances within the population goes up.  As the grievances go up, the security goes 
down.  As security goes down, military spending goes up which leads to non-military 
spending going down.  As non-military spending goes down, stakeholders must develop 
strategies to increase social entrepreneurship as a self-sustaining tactic to diminish the 
dependence on foreign investment.  As entrepreneurship goes up, alternate sources like 
foreign investment go up, and as foreign investment goes up, foreign aid will go down— 
which is what the donor government eventually wants.  The point of intervention would 
be investment in social entrepreneurship to take the cycle from vicious to virtuous.  In 
other words, investment in social entrepreneurship would reverse the process and reduce 
dependence on foreign aid.  
Rather than leaving the population needs to the government or private sector to 
address, these social entrepreneurs create innovative solutions, delivering higher than 
usual results while improving the lives of many people.  Investing in innovative solutions 
by, with and through social entrepreneurs and other NGOs instead of the usual foreign 
aid disbursement through the receiving government could be the answer to increase the 
efficacy of this funding. Other variables that could be addressed are trust between the 
receiving and donor government, decentralization of foreign aid through micro-alliances 
at the local level, governance and interest alignment between both countries.  These 
would be discussed in detail in Chapter IV.          
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IV. EFFECTIVE FUNDS’ MANAGEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Pak-U.S. alliance in the War on Terror, besides resulting in the loss of more 
than 35,000 citizens and 3,500 security personnel, has put enormous pressure on 
Pakistan‘s economy.  While the effects of destruction of infrastructure, internal migration 
of millions of people from parts of northwestern Pakistan, erosion of the investment 
climate, steep decline in production and growing unemployment are evident, the war has 
brought economic activity to a virtual standstill in major parts of the country.  ―Pakistan 
had never witnessed such devastating social and economic upheaval in its industry, even 
after dismemberment of the country by direct war.‖60  On the other side, the U.S. 
objectives and aspirations have not been fully realized in the area and there is a rising 
concern of fund utilization and justification.   
While the answers to the bigger concerns about future allocation of funds, 
disbursement, and accountability remain tied to the future U.S. policy on the issue, this 
chapter deals with the existing management of major military and non-military funds 
(i.e., Coalition Support Funds [CSF] and the Economic Support Funds [ESF], 
respectively).  Since the CSF and ESF constitute the bulk of the total funds provided to 
Pakistan, insight into their existing management would provide a broader understanding 
of their utility and contributions towards achieving major objectives.  Towards the end, 
ways to achieve better return on the U.S. investment in Pakistan would be discussed by 
exploring concepts like decentralization, micro-alliances, channelization, prioritization, 
reforms, accountability, and social entrepreneurship. 
B. COALITION SUPPORT FUNDS (MILITARY) 
The existing system of Coalition Support Funds (CSF) management, as shown in 
Figure 7, involves the following procedure for reimbursement to the Pakistan 
Government: 
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Figure 7. The Reimbursement Procedure 
 
The procedure for the reimbursement of CSF funds is given in the above block 
diagram, explaining that Pakistani claims are prepared and forwarded to the office of 
ODRP for reimbursement.61  Earlier, these claims were sent from ODRP to CENTCOM 
with little verification, however, in 2007, the Office of the Defense Representative to 
Pakistan (ODRP) was asked to play a bigger role in evaluating these claims before 
forwarding them to CENTCOM.62 Additionally, in response to a Defense Inspector 
General review conducted in 2003, DoD implemented additional guidance to improve 
oversight of the CSF reimbursed to Pakistan including, but not limited to, the following 
measures, where submitted costs can be: 
1. ―Recommended for approval‖ 
2. ―Deferred‖ and returned for additional documentation 
3. ―Disallowed‖ for not being consistent with the scope of CSF 
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ODRP reviews the Pakistani claims and indicates that to the best of their 
knowledge military support was provided and expenses were actually incurred. These 
claims are than sent to CENTCOM, where they are validated for their authenticity and it 
is ensured that Pakistani operations were essential to support U.S. military operations in 
the theater.63 The claims are then sent to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
(Comptroller), who: 
1. Performs a macro-level review comparing the cost to similar operations, 
and  
2. Assesses whether the cost categories are reasonable, selected 
subcategories are reasonable compared to U.S. costs, and costs are 
consistent with previous claims.64 
In addition, both the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and the State 
Department verify that the reimbursement is consistent with the U.S. government‘s 
National Security Strategy and that the CSF payment does not adversely impact the 
balance of power in the region. ―The United States reimbursed Pakistan about $5.56 
billion in CSF for military operations in FATA and other support in the war on terror. 
CSF reimbursement funds are paid directly into the Pakistani government treasury and 
become sovereign funds. Once they become sovereign funds, the U.S. government has no 
oversight authority over these funds.‖65  It may be noted that the DoD has disallowed or 
deferred a significantly greater amount of CSF reimbursement claims from Pakistan after 
the year 2007 due to the increasing trust deficit in the fields of intelligence sharing and 
disagreements on other issues.  It is also worth mentioning that the cost the U.S. is paying 
for Pakistan‘s services is not even one tenth of the cost it would incur if the U.S. and 
NATO forces get logistic support from different supply routes. 
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C. ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS (NON-MILITARY) 
All the direct overt U.S. Assistance to Pakistan totaled less than $90 million in 
2001, with food aid comprising $86 million and $4 million in limited security-related 
assistance. There was no assistance for economic development.  In 2002, Pakistan 
received $2.1 billion, including $665 million in economic aid.  Clearly Pakistan did not 
become needier; rather, Pakistan became important within the political context of the war 
on terror.66  The flow of already limited economic assistance to Pakistan fluctuated 
between 1971 and 2007.  This dramatic variation in assistance appears to have little to do 
with Pakistan‘s needs; rather, Washington‘s changing policy priorities towards the 
country at different points in history and efforts to achieve U.S. objectives drive the 
variation.67   
A major portion (57%) of the U.S. $10 billion aid (cost of cooperation) has gone 
into CSF; 18% was consumed in security assistance, and 16% was given to support the 
budget deficit, leaving only 10% as the ESF and humanitarian development, including for 
2005 earthquake assistance and education.  It comes out to be only $64 million per year 
for over 55 million school-aged children ($1.16 per child per year).  The U.S. has 
provided Pakistan with funds amounting to $6,536 million for the non-military activities 
including Child Survival and Health (CSH), development Assistance (DA), Food Aid, 
Human Rights and Democracy Funds (HRDF), International Disaster Assistance (IDA), 
Migration and Refuge Assistance (MRA), and Economic Support Funds (ESF).68  While 
the ESF had the major share of non-military funding ($4,797M), the ratio of military and 
non-military funds (3:1) clearly demonstrates the priority of the U.S. in favor of the direct 
military and security related assistance.   
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The majority of ESF Funds are received by the government and managed through 
respective ministries for the purpose intended.  However, owing to the limited amount of 
funds and the high number of problems, objectives remain far from achievement.  Weak 
financial institutions, mismanagement, corruption, and lack of accountability further 
compound the problem.  As a result, Pakistanis tend to believe that U.S. assistance to 
Pakistan is driven not out of humanitarian concern rather a cold requirement to sustain 
Pakistan‘s cooperation in the U.S. war on terrorism. This has led to various formulations 
such as the United States is buying Pakistan, leasing its military, creating a vassal state, 
and so forth.  Other programs such as U.S.-promoted educational reform of the religious 
schools and public school curriculum reform are often viewed warily as Washington-led 
attempts to de-Islamize Pakistan‘s educational system.69  The fact remains that ESF is 
neither enough nor aimed at supporting the weak economic infrastructure in Pakistan, 
raising the population grievances. 
D. BETTER RETURN ON THE U.S. INVESTMENT 
Measuring the effectiveness of any foreign assistance remains the most difficult 
task for any organization/state.  In case of the Pak-U.S. alliance, conducting a critical 
examination of military and non-military spending and the contribution they have made 
in achieving the U.S. objectives, it can be assessed that these funds have either been 
underutilized and/or not reached the intended recipient besides being grossly inadequate.  
―Although the new Obama strategy recognizes the importance of investing in Pakistan‘s 
future, the resources it plans to marshal are modest in relation both to the challenges 
Pakistan confronts as well as the central importance the administration assigns the 
country in its regional policy.‖
70
   
Notwithstanding the future course of the U.S. policy on the issue, the existing 
funds can be managed, to some extent, to provide a better return on the U.S. investment 
in Pakistan. Improvements and innovations in the current processes of fund distribution, 
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infrastructure, and monitoring through decentralization, micro-alliances, channelization, 
prioritization, reforms, and accountability are likely to enhance cost-effectiveness, 
improve perception, reduce the trust deficit and create an environment for a better 
relationship between the two countries. 
1. Decentralization and Institutionalization 
The existing structure of aid disbursement in Pakistan is generally centralized and 
offers less visibility to the donor, besides being inefficient. ―It is claimed that roughly 
half of all U.S. assistance pledged for Pakistan is spent on administrative costs, including 
highly paid foreign experts.‖
71 
 While some of the funds are deposited directly in the 
government treasury, having centralized disbursement, control and management, most of 
the other funds are either insufficient, mingled with other funds, fall prey to the higher 
administrative costs, and do not reach the intended recipient.  One such example is the 
disbursement of ―development assistance in FATA that runs the risk of falling prey to 
corruption by the inefficient and unaccountable institutions.‖
72
 The absence of credible 
institutions for the disbursement, monitoring and accountability of foreign assistance not 
only leaves these funds in the hands of incompetent/corrupt government officials but also 
gives rise to popular grievances.   
Decentralized disbursement of funds at provincial levels or even further 
decentralizing into various subsectors would be effective in bringing significant progress.  
The U.S., besides balancing the CSF with the ESF, needs to consider conditioning of the 
assistance on measurable/visible milestones in the respective sectors; Pakistan requires 
institutionalizing the aid disbursement mechanisms involving a foreign/non-government 
body for enhanced visibility and effective utility of various funds.  The decentralization 
may not affect the CSF disbursement setup; however, the ESF can be made effective 
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through decentralized disbursement, ensuring that the aid is reaching the intended 
recipient under coordinated, controlled and transparent conditions.  Therefore, 
decentralized disbursement of foreign aid through credible institutions would not only 
improve cost effectiveness but also assist in improving U.S. perception by the masses. 
2. Channelization and Accountability 
Corruption remains deep rooted in South Asia and Pakistan is no exception.  The 
very fabric of society has largely been destroyed by this menace, which is not only 
affecting the socio-economic structure but also defacing the image of the country 
globally. ―Corruption and lack of sufficient transparency is identified as a key obstacle to 
effective implementation of U.S. aid programs in Pakistan.‖
73 
 Pakistan‘s system of fund 
management lacks channelization and accountability, which is the foundation to achieve 
cost effectiveness and transparency, respectively.  A check and balance procedure 
through visibility and accountability is the second and foremost step towards success.   
While the Coalition Support Funds have a better system of disbursement with 
checks and balances, Economic Support Funds disbursement lacks the built-in 
mechanisms for the funds to be channeled systematically to the recipient, resulting in loss 
of capital.  The foreign aid is required to be channelized through non-government or 
semi-government organizations under the representatives of the aid donors for effective 
implementation of the assistance program.  The accountability mechanisms need to be 
incorporated within the system to ensure visibility/transparency of fund utilization. The 
areas that are most affected by lack of governance could take priority for rehabilitation 
over the others.  Pakistan needs to build reliable and credible financial institutions and 
strengthen its disbursement/accountability mechanisms to be effective in gaining optimal 
benefits from the valuable financial assistance. 
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3. Prioritization and Reforms 
―The politics of reforming Pakistan‘s governance process and tax structure may 
be among the most important obstacles to improving aid effectiveness.‖74  This may be 
true, but the fact that a major part of the current U.S. ‗pre-conditioned‘ assistance to 
Pakistan remains tied to pre-conceived objectives with little or no flexibility also poses 
serious limitations to incorporating reforms in the existing mechanisms.  However, 
Pakistan, in order to prioritize the funding in the sectors that deserve the most, would 
require a thorough inside-out approach to assess and revive the existing system, 
infrastructure, requirements and skills for handling the task effectively. The U.S., with a 
balanced and more population-centric approach towards Pakistan, can assist in 
establishing such a system without compromising on its short- and long-term objectives.   
Pakistan would be required to scrutinize its critical deficiencies in the existing 
infrastructure (including, but not limited to, education institutions, energy sector, social 
security, and socio-economic conditions) and evaluate them against the available 
resources in terms of national and foreign funds.  The reforms in the policies/structures 
would be the next step to streamline the spending in different sectors along with 
allocation of these resources, on a priority basis, to the sectors that require the most and 
are critical in addressing both the short-term and long-term issues.  Provision of security 
to the population in general and employment opportunities to the heavy youth bulge 
would not only serve to bring stability but also reduce dependence on foreign aid.  While 
it would be an uphill task for Pakistan under the current environment, the U.S. can assist 
by providing expertise, training, infrastructure and economic support that would not only 
enhance its perception but also lays foundation of a long-term strategic partnership. There 
is no denying the fact that while the U.S. revisits its strategy/policy towards Pakistan, 
prioritization of funds and system reforms would help pave way for a better return on the 
U.S. investment in Pakistan. 
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4. Entrepreneurship and Micro-Alliances 
One of the major policy concerns of Washington regarding Af-Pak has been 
creating stable conditions for economic growth that has not materialized even after 
spending billions of dollars in last 10 years. ―The answer centers on an often 
underestimated group, diluted into the vague mantra of ‗civil society‘, overwhelmingly 
ignored as a force for change in fragile states and conflict zones: business entrepreneurs.  
Their experience demonstrates that, while stability is invaluable, it is not always a pre-
condition for growth and development.‖75  The marble industry in FATA is a pertinent 
example of such business entrepreneurs that remains profitable and providing 
employment to thousands of workers despite poor security conditions.  These workers, in 
the absence of such opportunity, remain vulnerable to join extremists who are abundant 
in the area.  Rwanda, in the post-genocide era, exhibited the same structural innovation to 
enhance average farm income by 17% annually.76  
Entrepreneurship and innovation are the engines of any economy.77  ‗Ashoka‘ 
presents another clear and pertinent example to highlight the importance of 
entrepreneurships within a society.78  The economic growth is conditioned to availability 
of infrastructure for business/entrepreneurs and education to contribute to the society.  
Entrepreneurships start from small businesses that cultivate the culture and gradually 
grow in dimensions.  While Pakistan ranks 83
rd
 in the ease of doing business in the 
‗World Bank‘s Doing Business 2011‘ report and the policies of the government of 
Pakistan have never been supportive of small businesses; the enormous human resource 
potential and upcoming talented young entrepreneurs, like BAP, MITEFP, OPEN etc, 
provide a ray of hope to the country to embark on way to prosperity.
79
  While Pakistan 
                                                 
75 Michael Fairbanks, In the River they Swim: Essays from Around the World on Enterprise Solutions 
to Poverty (West Conshohocken, Pa: Templeton Foundation Press, 2009), 274.  
76 Ibid. 
77 Arabic Knowledge@Wharton, ―Entrepreneur Azeem Ibrahim on Rewriting a Pakistan‘s Economy 
Recovery from Scratch,‖ (October 19, 2010), (accessed on Sep 24, 2011), 3. 
78 Krauthammer: Krauthammer and Ashoka Sign a Partnership Agreement to Support Social 
Entrepreneurship. (United Kingdom, Coventry: Normans Media Ltd, 2009; 2009), n/a. 
79 Ortmans, Jonathan ―President, Public Forum Institute,‖ ―Spurring Indigenous Entrepreneurial 
Growth in Pakistan,‖ Entrepreneurship (20 December, 2010). 
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needs to introduce significant reforms to fully develop its entrepreneurial potential that 
provides all Pakistanis to benefit from opportunities for entrepreneurship, growth, 
employment and innovation; a strong support is required from the international 
community (U.S. in specific) to establish such infrastructure.   
Social entrepreneurship is the catalyst to alleviate the reliance on foreign aid.  
Pakistan, besides having enormous potential for entrepreneurship and micro-alliances, 
has shown an increasing trend of the same with a reasonable degree of success in variety 
of fields including, but not limited to, telecommunication, small scale businesses, cottage 
industries, carpets/cotton markets, marble industries, and textile products. Therefore, 
Instead of providing financial assistance, promoting entrepreneurial principles to 
encourage social transformation could be more beneficial in the long term for the U.S.  In 
the context of brining socio-economic development and easing economic hardships from 
the people of the areas freed from the extremists, the U.S. should assist in investment and 
rehabilitation in the ROCs (Reconstruction Opportunity Zones) for creating employment 
opportunities for the people.
80
 
As mentioned earlier, as entrepreneurship goes up, alternate sources like foreign 
investment goes up, and as foreign investment goes up, foreign aid will go down which is 
what the U.S. would be desiring.  The U.S. policy makers may consider support to local 
entrepreneurs in Pakistan as a major force for both change and stability. The financial and 
technical support including access to the U.S. markets, relaxation in tariffs/export 
requirements, entry into global trading system and similar facilitations would not only 
provide a positive way forward to the youth (65% of Pakistan‘s total population) but also 
reduce reliance on the foreign assistance. Once initiated, the entrepreneurial culture 
would have the strength not only to direct the country towards a progressive economy but 
also free it from dependence on foreign aid besides creating positive effects on the 
society that in turn would assist in isolating the extremists from the population.  
Therefore, the strategy should be to generate social entrepreneurship to create a self-
sustaining mechanism, which will eventually erode the vicious cycle of foreign aid 
                                                 
80 Arabic Knowledge@Wharton, Entrepreneur Azeem Ibrahim on Rewriting a Pakistan’s Economy 
Recovery from Scratch, 2. 
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dependence.  A proposition that suits the U.S. as it not only reduces the burden on the 
U.S. economy but also contributes in achieving the long term strategic relationship with 
Pakistan besides a likely reduction in extremism and enhancement in pro-U.S. sentiments 
within Pakistan.    
E. SUMMARY  
The evaluation of cost-benefit of foreign aid intervention poses challenging 
problems owing to the lack of measures of its effectiveness and contribution towards 
achieving the set objectives.  What has been discussed in this chapter simply suggests 
ways and means to achieve better return on the current U.S. investment in Pakistan.  
While little could be altered in the military funds (CSF), a significant improvement can 
be made in non-military funds‘ expenditure through various reforms, restructuring, 
decentralization, micro-alliances, channelization, prioritization, accountability and 
facilitating entrepreneurships.  The most important link in achieving this would be the 
U.S. approach to the problem, shift in aid policies and willingness to adopt a population-
centric approach while keeping its strategic goals in sight.  Pakistan needs to mobilize its 
resources in order to achieve entrepreneurial culture in the country and reduce 
dependence on foreign aid.  
While the effective fund management may bring some improvement in cost-
benefit equation for both the states, it would certainly not be the answer for bigger 
concerns like the growing trust deficit between the two allies and the future of their 
relationship.  ―While the leadership of the two countries place a high value on their ties, 
and acknowledge the dangers of a collapse of their relationship, their publics and 
legislatures do not share these perceptions and increasingly view the other with suspicion 
and depict one another as an unreliable ally.‖81 To evaluate such a unique situation in the 
relationship and calculate the pros and cons of each other‘s moves, let us utilize the game 
theoretical approach to analyze the situation under varying sets of conditions. 
                                                 
81 Maleeha Lodhi and National Defense Univ. Washington DC, Inst. for National Strategic Studies, 
―The Future of Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Opportunities and Challenges,‖ Defense Technical Information 
Center, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA497485; 1. 
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V. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: A GAME THEORETICAL 
APPROACH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is dedicated to provide a game theoretic approach to critically 
evaluate Pak-U.S. relations in different aspects. The suggested game theory model 
provides a heuristic tool that will help evaluate not only the existing puzzle but also other 
economic, social, and political relations. Additionally, this model can be modified to 
address other related situations in the context of cost benefit analysis.82 
In international relations (IR), states and sovereign countries build their strategies 
and policies according to their national interests. They rationally engage each other in an 
attempt to advance their national interests, protect themselves, or maximize their 
returns/profits and reduce associated costs. Many international relation theories are 
dedicated to explaining and understanding the states‘ behavior in the global 
environment.83 The base line is that all states make decisions to advance their perceived 
national interest according to the prevalent threat or profit perception in a rational 
manner. In doing so, they are basically carrying out a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in 
order to determine their best options. Therefore, countries thoroughly analyze their 
available options to plan their future moves, in a way that will yield maximum profit with 
minimum cost.84 
                                                 
82 The game here mainly captures the essence of a game describes a situation between two major auto 
companies and their decision toward a lobbying effort to effect public policy (the 1990 clean air act). The 
game was designed by Evelyn Fink, Scott Gates, Brian Humes, and published in their book ―Game theory 
Topics.‖ For more read Evelyn C. Fink, Scott Gates and Brian D. Humes, Game Theory Topics: Incomplete 
Information, Repeated Games, and N-Player Games, Vol. 122 (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 
1998), 69, 7. 
83 Stephen M. Walt, ―International Relations: One World, Many Theories,‖ Foreign Policy, no. 110, 
Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), 29–46. 
84 Anthony E. Boardman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, 
N.J.: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2006), 45–47. 
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The challenges faced in the use of cost-benefit calculations in international 
relation (IR) arose from the simple fact that most IR goods have non-tangible factors.85 
Therefore, they are hard to value and cannot be precisely calculated in monetary terms.86 
Hence, it is hard to assign quantitative measures, money or numbers, for instance, to 
different IR qualitative goods like peace, war, political influence, perception, terrorism, 
human lives, and environmental issues. Therefore, to simplify their analysis, players use 
cost benefit techniques that allow them to assign values to these goods. 
Cost-benefit techniques are used to determine the best course of action (COA) or 
decision by assigning values (i.e., ―payoffs‖) to the different strategies. These techniques 
are used to simplify the cost-benefit analysis and provide a tool to differentiate between 
different strategies, policies, or options. However, in cost benefit calculation analysis, one 
should not only consider the profit and return on investment, but also the cost associated 
with these profits and relevant consequences.  
CBA usually represents one-sided systematic analysis that highlights the most 
profitable choice among others in monetary terms. Game theory, in contrast, represents 
the rational approach to reach a decision when others are involved and/or when we have 
to choose between different strategies. The marriage between the two can produce a vital 
tool that can help predict best strategies that can produce maximum profit. In our game 
theory, both costs and benefits extend beyond the financial costs of the players‘ strategies 
 
 
                                                 
85 In their book Rethinking Cost Benefit Analysis, the writers Mathew Adler and Erick Posner 
discussed the challenges facing the use of CBA in general and in political science in particular. The writers 
refuted all theoretical objections, additionally; they identified these problems to be categorized in two main 
groups ―Practical and Ideological.‖ The writers state that ―As a practical matter, researchers had a great 
deal of trouble obtaining relevant data, especially for the purpose of valuing environmental resources, 
human life, and other hard-to-measure goods. The claim that the benefits of a project exceed its costs is not 
persuasive when the benefits and: the costs appear to rely on arbitrary valuations. As an ideological matter, 
the technical and utilitarian flavor of CBA was unappealing to the political culture that prevailed during the 
19‘70s.‖ Then the writers provide the following explanation to the resent development of CBA in political 
culture, ―It may be that progress in valuation techniques and changes in ideology, or perhaps a sense that 
regulation had gone too far, account for the reemergence of CBA in the 1980s and 1990s-it is too early to 
tell.‖ Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, ―Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis,‖ The Yale Law Journal 
109, no. 2 (November 1999), 165–247. 
86 Ibid. 
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to embrace social and political intangible values like domestic and global public 
perception, and political influence gained or exercised by the players in their domestic 
and international milieus.     
Political Influence, for instance, is one of the vital and most important tools for 
international interactions, where the states seek to enhance their political status by 
engaging each other through alliances.  Influence has a two-fold impact among the 
players having different status in the international community.  First, it increases the 
strong player‘s influence in another environment by the use of soft and/or hard power.  
Secondly, it expands the national interest of both the players in their own prime interest. 
Political Influence mainly can be obtained by the intensive use of hard and soft 
power. However, the hard power tools used in such interactions can be of two forms: 
coercive measures that force others for compliance, or methods of inducement where 
monetary assistance is used to advance one‘s interests.  In simple terms it could be 
expressed as the ―stick and carrot‖ policy. The soft power, on the other hand, deals with 
the power of attraction and your ability to obtain desired behavior by attracting people 
instead of coercing them.  
In order to advance the argument on soft power,87 Joseph Nye recognizes its 
importance to advance national interests. In his words, he explained how the loss of 
(U.S.) soft power in 2003 prevented Turkey from providing expected cooperation. The 
Turkish parliament refused to grant access to the American troops to use its land and 
enter Iraq from the north due to anti-American sentiments and U.S. unpopularity in 
Turkey at that time. Hence, the loss of soft power interfered with the U.S. ability to 
exercise its hard power. Nye identified the public opinion as a crucial element in soft 
power, where ―the public opinion abroad creates either an enabling or disabling 
environment.‖88 Nye proceeds to explain that, ―if being a pro-American is a kiss of death 
to foreign leaders…‖89 the foreign leaders will be less able to give the U.S. what they 
                                                 
87 Trudy Rubin, ―Joseph Nye on Soft Power,‖ American Academy of Political and Social Science 




want or provide the expected/desired cooperation. Hence, the public perception is another 
important element that needs to be considered for favorable outcomes in the form of 
expected cooperation in the cost-benefit analysis. 
Another example of the impact of public opinion and perception is the consensus 
building during the invasion of Iraq in the year 2003. The establishment of coalition 
forces in the 2
nd
 Gulf War demonstrates how the absence of soft power reduced the U.S. 
ability to achieve the same consensus from all the countries as compared to the coalition 
established during the 1
st
 Gulf War.  Such factors are considered important and included 
as the enabling factors to carry out the cost-benefit analysis through game theory. 
The relationship between political influence and public perception is somehow 
intertwined and has a strong connection. Nye describes how positive public perception 
facilitates political influence to a degree that reduces the costs and increases mutual 
benefits. On the other hand, negative public perception can interfere with the players‘ 
ability to obtain desired outcomes in terms of political influence by increasing the costs to 
the limits that outweighs the benefits. In this context, it could be said that benefits are 
directly proportional to both the public perception, and political influence. 
Based on cost-benefit analysis, the game generally describes the strategies 
adopted by the U.S. and Pakistan. Both the players are pursuing their national interests as 
well as other regional and international interests. In its advanced stages, the game 
explains the different political rationale of the two players in the historical context and 
how that works as a fundamental game changer. Moreover, it also shows how different 
political approaches have exacerbated Pakistan‘s fears and firmed the U.S. strategies that 
eventually distanced bilateral relations. Despite the fact that both players have vital 
importance to each other, the game demonstrates the impact of historical interactions on 
the players‘ rationale as well as the element of mistrust and the perception of betrayal 
effects.  The game will attempt to evaluate such relation to provide bases for the 
prediction/evaluation of the players‘ future moves.  Consequently, the game will try to 
identify suitable tools that can be used to enhance mutual cooperation. Moreover, it 
would lay the foundations for a roadmap that can help to bridge bilateral relations and 
give possibilities of a way ahead. 
 49 
In the light of historical examples of bilateral relations between the U.S. and 
Pakistan, the game is structured in four different stages.  In the first stage of the game, it 
is assumed that both players lack any previous engagement. The second stage represents 
the one-side game, where one of the players decides to have one strategy that yields 
better payoffs, regardless of his counterpart‘s strategy. The third stage is played in light 
of the lessons learned from the previous two stages, where the U.S. and Pakistan are able 
to develop their intricate rationale and build a game perception that will affirm their 
choices in any future interaction. Hence, the final stage of the game will examine the 
recent developments in U.S.-Pakistan relations, as well as clarifying how both the U.S. 
and Pakistan have developed their rationale, and how this rationale has fundamentally 
changed the players‘ approach to the game. 
B. GENERALIZED MODEL 
The model recognizes four main elements, which usually have high correlation in 
the context of international interaction: The perceived costs (C), Received Benefits (B), 
Public Perception (P), and the gained Political Influence (I). The costs and benefits are 
recognized to be the basic elements that motivate interactions. However, the other two 
elements are important supporting elements in the IR. Perception stands for the local 
public opinion and their perception about the cooperation and motives behind it. On the 
other hand, the influence element measures the degree of influence a country receives 
based on its cooperation or the incentives so provided. 
The two players have two different strategies, either to cooperate or defect. 
Mutual cooperation can provide fruitful results. It may presumably enhance one players‘ 
influence in a new political environment if the other player‘s interest is considered in 
return. This may also help in building up favorable public perception. The mutual 
defection is assumed to have trivial value or none at all, as both the players will be unable 
to interact for any gain or loss. Another option is the free ride option, where any one 
player has a strong incentive to defect and enjoy free ride on behalf of the other players‘ 
constraints/limitations. This would secure him the benefit and influence; however, as a 
result the public perception of both players will be lost. 
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The simple representation of the CBA is to calculate the net profit (NP), which is 
the benefit (B) after subtracting the associated cost (C). Mathematically, NP can be 
defined as follows: 
    NP = B - C  
According to the game, two more vital elements are included: Influence (I) and 
Perception (P). Therefore, NP for this game will be calculated as follows: 
    NP= B – C + I + P 
From the equation above, it could also be said that B  P  I, therefore: 
B-C+I+P > B-C > B-C-I > B-C-I-P ≥ 0 
1. Assumptions and Rules 
a. Assumptions: 
1) Both players are rational actors. 
2) The game is conducted with imperfect information,90 (i.e. neither 
player knows the other player‘s move in advance). 
3) Both players seek to maximize their payoffs. 
b. Rules: 
1) The two main strategies for both the U.S. and Pakistan are either to 
cooperate or defect. 
2) The game uses cardinal scaling from zero to 4. 
3) Scoring:  
i. Value of the best option is four (4) on the scale. 
ii. The second best option is three (3). 
iii. The second worst option is one (1). 
iv. The worst option is zero (0). 
                                                 
90A game of imperfect information ―is one in which neither player knows the actions of the other 
player before playing her own strategy.‖ Fink, Gates and Humes, Game Theory Topics: Incomplete 
Information, Repeated Games, and N-Player Games, 11. 
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The basic game strategies are presented in Table 2. They manifest the players‘ 
available options and strategies. The assigned values are presented thereafter.  
 


















The game is built on cost-benefit analysis, where both players consider the 
benefits, associated cost, perception and influence. The game in this manner will be 
symmetric and the players‘ options will look alike. The expected payoffs of each player 











Table 3.   Description of the Strategies 
 Description Remarks 
AC Both countries cooperate to attain their respective 
national interests and provide adequate help to each 
other. 
In this case both players receive their full net profit after 
bearing the expected costs.  
The assumption here is that the players will enjoy the 
desired influence along with positive public perception. 
The game 
payoffs for each 
player is 
NP = [B-C+P+I] 
AD The U.S. extends cooperation, while Pakistan defects. 
The assumption is that Pakistan wishes to enjoy a free 
ride. 
Pakistan  
NP = B + I 
BC The U.S. defects and Pakistan extends cooperation.  The 
assumption is that the U.S. wishes to enjoy a free ride.  
U.S.  
NP = B + I 
BD Both players defect and cease cooperation. No interaction is 
assumed. Hence 
no profit. (0) 
  
The rationale of the game is that the net profit increases only through mutual 
cooperation. The players will successfully gain political influence and improve their 
respective public perception (B-C+P+I). Mutual defection, on the contrary, gives no 
benefits at all (0, 0). On the other hand, if one of the players cooperates and the other 
defects, this will yield profit to the defector and maintain his influence over the other 
player (B+I). In this case, the cooperating player bares heavy costs and loses considerable 
influential value over the defector. This would add more to the costs of the cooperating 
player and strain the mutual relationship. In this situation, we assume that the defector 
will not suffer loss in terms of public perception, since he is not affecting its public 
expectations. Whereas the player who remains committed will not be able to meet his 
public expectations and will eventually lose his public perception (B-C-P+I).  Table 4 
represents the players‘ payoffs in the generalized form. 
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(B-C+P+I, B-C+P+I) (B-C-P+I, B+I) 
Defect 
B 
(B+I, B-C-P+I) (0,0) 
 
The generalized payoff model provides a tool to precisely determine the best 
available options as well as avoid limiting the analysis to a small set of payoffs.91 The 
challenges associated with the data collection are prominent, moreover; the challenge of 
precisely finding the utility method suitable to determine the precise value of influence 
and perception is evident. However, the game in this form only represents the initial 
stages of the interaction, where none of the players has pre-knowledge of the other‘s 
move (i.e., ―imperfect information‖); after playing the game more often, the players begin 
to develop their own perspective about the game and their partners. 
C. STAGE ONE: INITIAL PHASE – SETTING THE STAGE  
This stage describes the U.S.-Pakistan relation according to the generalized model 
and how the players approach the game. To simplify the game, cardinal values will be 
assigned to the payoffs to represent their weight. Since the game is symmetric, we will 
only analyze the preferences of one player in terms of his payoffs and then apply the 
results to the other player. From the game setup: 
Since, 
B-C+I+P > B-C > B-C-I > B-C-I-P ≥ 0. If NP ≥ 0, and B, C, I, P ≥ 0 
                                                 
91 Fink, Gates and Humes, Game Theory Topics, 27. 
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Therefore, 
B+I > B-C+P+I > B-C-P-I ≥ 0 
It is assumed that the U.S. would like to get more political influence over Pakistan 
in order to achieve its regional goals and advance its national security objectives. 
Therefore, it will be looking to maximize both their benefits and political control. At the 
same time, it would seek means to reduce its costs to ensure cost-effective and successful 
strategy. For the U.S., the most valuable option is to enjoy a free rider option in the game. 
This would allow it to maximize benefits, gain influence and minimize its associated 
costs. This option will be assigned a value of 4. This value could only be achieved by 
applying the defection strategy (U.S.) while the other player (Pakistan) continues to 
cooperate. However, the U.S. understands that it cannot maintain such a situation for 
long. Instead, it needs to obtain the same benefits and influence by providing an incentive 
to Pakistan to attain her cooperation strategy. This will put the U.S. in its second position 
where it needs to extend cooperation and bear more costs, which will reduce its benefits. 
Only the U.S. can determine whether these benefits are valuable enough to justify their 
costs. This option will be given a value of 3. If Pakistan defects and the U.S. continues its 
cooperation, that will put it in its next worst option with a value of 1, since there will be 
some benefits to both players that can be extracted. However, the mutual defection will 
provide no benefits to the U.S. and would be given the value of zero (0). Pakistan will 
also analyze the situation using the same rational and use the same approach to the game. 
The players‘ options can be translated into the cardinal values as follow: 
1. Player’s Options 
a. Best Choice: To enjoy a free ride while the other player seek cooperation 
and provides adequate benefits with a value of 4. 
b. Next Best Choice: Both players cooperate with each other to advance 
their respective national interests. In this case, both players provide 
adequate cost to gain mutual benefit with a corresponding value of 3.  
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c. Next Choice: To be the game sucker, where one player harvests all the 
benefits while the other pays/delivers the associated costs. This option has 
a value of 1. 
d. Worst Option: The mutual defect, where both players stop their 
interaction. We assume here that no costs or benefits are associated with 
this option with a value of 0. However, in reality there are significant 
losses associated with such defection. Therefore, when the states stop their 
interactions, they usually seek other engagements that will keep them from 
losing perceived benefits. Table 5 shows the assigned cardinal values for 
both players. 
 












(3, 3) (1, 4) 
Defect 
B 
(4, 1) (0,0) 
 
The game presented above captures the essence of the basic chicken game,92 
where there are perceived benefits involved. The greatest benefit from the players‘ 
perspective can be obtained by being the free rider. The next beneficial outcome appears 
with the mutual cooperation. The next worst when one of the player defects and the other 
remains cooperating. The worst outcome arises when both player defect. Table 6 
illustrates the movement diagram of the two players. 
                                                 
92 Fink, Gates and Humes, Game Theory Topics, 9 
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Coop  Defect 
U.S. 
Coop (3, 3)  (1, 4)   
      
Defect (4, 1)  (0,0)   
 




The movement diagram suggests that without communication, none of the players 
has a dominant strategy. Both players have an incentive to defect and enjoy a free ride on 
the other‘s cost. The game has three equilibrium points. Two are pure strategy Pareto 
optimal equilibrium points,93 and the third is mixed strategy equilibrium. Nash 
equilibrium94 is (3, 3), where both players pursue cooperation. Additionally, the strategic 
moves analysis suggests that none of the players can increase his payoffs by moving first 
or forcing the other player to do so. Additionally none of the players has a threat or a 
promise that can be used to alter the game. The solution of the game is enclosed in the 
Appendix. 
The security levels for both players are their third option. The value of the game is 
(1, 1). Both players have a pure prudential strategy to Defect 100% of the time, if the 
other player holds his payoffs down. Pakistan has to play a mixed strategy with 50% 
                                                 
93 An outcome of a game is Pareto Optimal if no other outcome that makes every player at least as 
well off and at least one player strictly better off.  That is, a Pareto optimal outcome cannot be improved 
upon without hurting at least one player.  Often a Nash equilibrium is not Pareto Equilibrium implying that 
that the players payoffs can all be increased. For more read Philip D. Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy 
by Philip D. Straffin, Vol. 36 (Washington: Mathematical Association of America, 1993), 244. and Fink, 
Gates and Humes, Game Theory Topics: Incomplete Information, Repeated Games, and N-Player Games, 
69. 
94 Nash equilibrium calculations will be discussed thereafter. This can be reached if both players play 
the game with 50% Coop. and 50% defect. 
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Coop and 50% Defect to equalize the U.S. Pakistan‘s value of the game becomes 2. The 
U.S. has to adopt the same strategy to equalize Pakistan with a game value of 2. Nash 
Arbitration is (3, 3), which can be achieved when both players play 50% of the time 
cooperation and 50% defect or simply cooperate. 
2. Observation 
The game suggests that, usually, both players will attempt to improve their 
respective payoffs. The status quo implies that none of the players can be forced to go 
below his security level if they accept to proceed with the game. On the other hand, both 
players will maintain a strong incentive to defect from the equilibrium point to improve 
their payoffs. However, none of them can improve his payoffs by moving first or forcing 
the other to do so. Moreover, none of them have a credible threat or a promise to offer in 
order to force or persuade the other player. The best outcome of both players comes from 
mixed strategy or mutual cooperation that, over a course of time, can enhance their 
payoffs. The cardinal values introduced in the game only illustrate preferable payoffs, but 
do not give a precise value of the payoffs. Further examination would reveal that the 
defection incentive can be reduced. 
From the above observations, both the U.S. and Pakistan cannot improve their 
status in the initial engagement without the other player‘s cooperation. While neither has 
the initiative to change the game to their benefit, they cannot dictate any preconditions 
that help improve their status in the advanced stages. On the other hand, both players can 
overcome any attempt to reduce their payoffs if they use their equalizing strategy with a 
greater value than their security levels. The game suggests that the players cannot get 
more benefits by using their mixed strategies, where they will always seek defection to 
pursue their interests. Therefore, to advance their interests the players need to concentrate 
on their cooperation strategies. In this stage, public perception has minimal impact on the 
players‘ strategies while political influence is directly proportional to their benefits. The 
model captures the trend of the two countries‘ paradoxical relations, where in their 
attempts to unilaterally improve their payoffs or alter the game to their advantage, they 
always return to their likely outcome. 
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In reality, Pakistan‘s sense of insecurity against India and her economic 
challenges after the partition pushed her to seek external support. The U.S., in contrast, 
did not perceive any benefit from providing the needed security guarantee to Pakistan 
against India, or economic aid.95 However, the growing communist threat in the region 
provided an incentive to the U.S. to maintain a balanced policy toward Pakistan, which 
eventually enabled both countries to maintain cooperation ties. Notably, their cooperation 
suffered whenever their divergent interests came under the spotlight or when they tried to 
advance unilateral interests. Therefore, ―their national interests have often diverged, as 
have their policies, even when their interests have substantially overlapped.‖96 
The fluctuating trend in their relationship pushed both countries to take advantage 
of any arrangement of cooperation to advance their interests, especially if it served vital 
national interest. Therefore, ―both have been tempted to clinch short-term objectives at 
the expense of broader strategic purpose.‖97 One of these arrangements was the military 
aid program. Pakistan provided her air basis to the U.S. to keep a close eye over their 
communist enemy. In return, Pakistan expected more military and security support that 
would enable her to overcome any Indian threat. This arrangement kept the U.S.-Pakistan 
ties alive and sustainable. Benefits, from the U.S. perspective, outweighed costs, but 
fundamentally changed the relation to become more transactional in nature. 
D. STAGE TWO: LONG-TERM VS. SHORT-TERM RELATIONS 
The Pak-U.S. relationship, as projected in the first stage of this model, was 
interrupted in 1965 during the Pakistan-India war.  Although the signs of this interruption 
came as early as 1962, when the U.S. released a rapid military aid package to India that 
aggravated Pakistan‘s fears,98 the real damage was done in 1965.  The U.S. had its 
suspicion about growing Pak-China ties. In 1965, the U.S. did not perceive any benefits 
from supporting Pakistan against India.  At the same time, the U.S. realized that 
                                                 
95 Hafeez Malik, Pakistan: Founder’s Aspirations and Today’s Realities (Karachi: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 306. 
96 Touqir Hussain, ― U.S.-Pakistan Relations: What Trust Deficit?‖ The Middle East Institute - Policy 
Brief 21 (November, 2010), 6. http://www.mei.edu/. 
97 Ibid. 
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Pakistan‘s regional policies, driven by her security paranoia, could jeopardize U.S. 
regional interests and increase its costs.  During this time, the U.S. was totally 
preoccupied with Vietnam and its bitter consequences, which exacerbated fears of any 
further military involvement in South Asia.  Therefore, the U.S. decided to stay out of 
Pakistan and South Asia.  Stage 2 of the game will examine both the events after 1965, 
and the U.S. approach to the game and its impact on the outcome. 
The change in U.S. policies after 1965 had altered the game to become a one-side 
game. We assume that, in the course of its interactions, the U.S. decided not to connect 
its regional interests to those of Pakistan, which would limit its ability to conduct a 
comprehensive regional strategy. However, Pakistan‘s geopolitical position necessitated 
the U.S. to keep lines of communication open.99 This stage is meant to demonstrate the 
changing trends in the game after 1965. 
1. One-Side Chicken Game100 
The one-side game is defined as the game where one player has a dominant 
strategy that secures him the best payoffs.101 We do not intend to change the game to a 
perfect information game, so as to avoid its becoming a sequential game.    
A sequential game is one in which players make decisions (or select a 
strategy) following a certain predefined order, and in which at least some 
players can observe the moves of players who preceded them. If no 
players observe the moves of previous players, then the game is 
simultaneous. If every player observes the moves of every other player, 
the game is one of perfect information. If some (but not all) players 
observe prior moves, while others move simultaneously, the game is one 
of imperfect information. Sequential games are represented by game trees 
(the extensive form) and solved using the concept of rollback, or sub-game 
perfect equilibrium. 
Neither the game assumptions nor its rules have changed from the previous stage; 
however, the scores were adjusted to accommodate the change in both the U.S. and 
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101 Fink, Gates and Humes, Game Theory Topics, 69.  
 60 
Pakistan‘s perceptions. The second best option for both players becomes two (2) instead 
of three (3).  Additionally, the mutual defect option in this case is to the U.S.‘ benefit and 
against Pakistan, which will be explained later. 
The game strategies are presented in Table 7. While the game is constructed based 
on cost-benefit analysis, it excludes the public perception value (where both players 
consider only the costs, benefits, and their political influence, and assign insignificant 
value to the public perception or none at all) from its calculations. The game in this 
manner will be asymmetric and the players‘ options will not be similar.  Subsequently, 
the players‘ strategies are represented in Table 8. 
 

























Table 8.   One-Side Game Strategies‘ Description 
 Description Remarks 
AC Both countries cooperate to attain their respective 
national interests and provide adequate help ―cost‖ to 
each other. 
 
The game represents 
the rulers‘ perception 
of Pakistan‘s national 
interests. 
AD U.S. extends the hand of cooperation while Pakistan 
defects and stops Coop with the assumption that she 
will enjoy a free ride. 
 
BC U.S. withheld cooperation and defect to enjoy a free 
ride while Pakistan Cooperates.  
 
BD Both players defect and stop cooperation. This will hurt 
Pakistan 
 
2. The Players’ Options 
According to the strategies description, the players‘ payoffs are demonstrated 
below. The payoffs are represented by cardinal values:  
a. Pakistan’s Options 
1) Best Choice: To enjoy a free ride. This will ultimately 
advance Pakistan‘s national interests and enhance her 
prestige. This option will assume a cardinal value of 4.  
2) Next Best Choice: Both players cooperate with each other 
in order to advance their respective national interests. The 
next best option will assume a cardinal value of 2. 
3) Next Choice: To comply and cooperate, while the U.S. 
defects. This should be the worst option for Pakistan in 
these circumstances. Pakistan‘s rulers perceived this 
situation as a precondition for any future cooperation. It is 
assumed here that, due to the security paranoia of Pakistan, 
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its rulers prefer to keep lines of cooperation opened to 
advance their interests. This option will assume a cardinal 
value of 1. 
4) Worst Option: The mutual defect, where both players stop 
their interaction. From Pakistan‘s perspective, this option 
may jeopardize their gains and endanger the country. This 
option entails a negative value to them, which they cannot 
afford. In this game, we intend only to explain the U.S. 
approach to the game. Therefore, the value assigned is 0. 
Hypothetically, we assume that no costs or benefits are 
associated with this option, since Pakistan had the option to 
realign herself with China or make new alliances. The 
worst option will assume a cardinal value of 0. 
b. U.S. Options 
1) Best Choice: Pakistan complies without U.S. commitment. 
For the U.S., this option provides the best payoffs without 
any costs. Additionally, this option helps the U.S. to reduce 
any future costs and secure better payoffs in any future 
arrangements. This option will assume a cardinal value of 
4. 
2) Next Best Choice: The mutual defect. This option relieves 
the U.S. from any security and financial commitment to 
Pakistan; meanwhile, it enhances U.S. political options in 
the region and increases its strategic options. This option 
will assume a cardinal value of 2. 
3) Next Choice: Both players cooperate with each other to 
advance their respective national interests. The U.S., at that 
time, recognizes that any commitment in the region would 
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limit their foreign policy and complicate their calculations. 
This option will assume a cardinal value of 1. 
4) Worst Option: To cooperate while Pakistan defects. From 
the American perspective, the cost of this option outweighs 
any benefit. Table 9 shows the cardinal values assigned 
according to these options for both players. Subsequently, 
Table 10 illustrates the movement diagram of this game. 
This option will assume a cardinal value of 0. 
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The movement diagram demonstrates the U.S. dominant strategy to defect. On the 
other hand, Pakistan does not have a dominant strategy. The game now has one 
equilibrium point. The likely outcome is (4, 1), where the U.S. defects and Pakistan 
cooperates. The solution of the game is enclosed in the Appendix. 
Form the strategic move analysis, Pakistan has a combination of threat and 
promise that does not work. Therefore, Pakistan cannot force the U.S. to go below the 
likely outcome without communication.  Whereas, the U.S. has only a promise that works 
alone, but it is not better than the likely outcome. This suggests that the U.S. has the 
initiative that controls the engagement in the game. Whenever the U.S. wants to obtain 
Pakistan‘s cooperation, it will use the promise. Thereafter, it may disengage and 
maximize its benefit.  The game provides an explanation of the ―Roller Coaster‖102 
character of Pak-U.S. relations. The disengagement strategy suited the U.S. regional 
foreign policy at that time, where the U.S. managed to get Pakistan‘s cooperation anytime 
without any security or financial commitment.  
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While the U.S. has a prudential dominant strategy to defect 100% of the time, 
Pakistan is always restricted to use only its cooperation strategy, if Pakistan wanted keep 
the U.S. payoffs down at any point of the game.  Pakistan‘s security level is (1), which is 
the third option with the game value of 1.  In contrast, the U.S. security level is (2) with 
its dominant strategy, which holds Pakistan‘s payoffs down through the game. 
Additionally, the game value for the U.S. is 2, which is its second best option. 
In this situation, Pakistan does not have any equalizing strategy against the U.S. 
While there is no incentive to the U.S. to equalize Pakistan, they can easily achieve that 
through the use of a mixed strategy, cooperating 1/3 of the time and defecting 2/3 of the 
time.. The U.S. can then equalize Pakistan with a value of 1.333, which is less than its 
security level.  The players‘ status quo is (2, 1) and Nash arbitration point is (3, 1.75).  To 
get this value, Pakistan has to play 75% Cooperation and 25% Defect, while the U.S. has 
to play 25% Cooperation and 75% Defect. 
3. Observation 
The strategic moves analysis and the security levels suggest that the U.S. is in a 
better position than that of Pakistan. The U.S. in this game firmly controls Pakistan. 
Additionally, the U.S. has the initiative and the ability to obtain Pakistan‘s cooperation 
whenever the U.S. wants, using its promise.  However, Pakistan has a threat and promise 
that does not work alone.  The combination of the two does not leave Pakistan in a better 
situation and restricts its maneuverability.  Although the U.S. security level is relatively 
higher in such context, the game also reveals a greater weakness, where the U.S. has to 
accept a lower status whenever they need Pakistan‘s cooperation. Therefore, despite the 
U.S. promise advantage and their ability to obtain Pakistan‘s cooperation any time under 
any conditions, the costs associated with such compliance seems to be high, especially if 
Pakistan chooses not to cooperate fully.  This would undermine the U.S. strategy and 
leave it with its worst option.  One of the vital weaknesses of the U.S. strategy is that it 
also neglects the public perception, which can be interpreted as a weakness in their public 
diplomacy and soft power. 
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From the player‘s perspective, they can improve their Net Profit either by 
reducing the associated cost and/or increasing their profits and political influence. This, 
from the U.S. perspective, can be achieved by accommodating Pakistan‘s rulers. 
Historically, the U.S. pursued a self-interest strategy during the Cold War that enabled it 
to achieve its regional interests against both the Soviet Union and China.
103
 This strategy 
enabled the U.S. to reduce both commitment and costs.  At the same time, the U.S. 
increased its benefits, especially those related to military and political influence. From a 
cost-benefit perspective, this strategy represents the best option. While supporting 
‗inclined leadership‘ inside Pakistan, the U.S. has improved its political and strategic 
influence as well as reduced the associated costs. However, it neglected the public 
perception to the level that it started to accumulate negative values. 
The perception of the Pakistani public is well described by Touqer Hussain, who 
asserts:  
the people of Pakistan, for their part, feel that they have borne the brunt of 
the cost of this untrustworthy relationship. It is they who have been 
saddled with poor civilian and military leadership, allied with the United 
States. In return for advancing the U.S. strategic interests, Pakistan‘s 
governing elites were handsomely compensated and managed to maintain 
a stranglehold over the system and disregard reforms. This ―bad bargain‖ 
is precisely what has been driving a wedge between the Pakistani people 
and the U.S.-supported governing elites and, by extension, between the 
U.S. and the Pakistani people.104  
The short-term military-centric engagements that suited the U.S. foreign policy 
towards Pakistan have adversely affected Pakistan‘s public perception and enhanced their 
military and civil elite status, reducing the people‘s confidence in their government. 
At this stage, the game adequately represents the U.S.-Pakistan relations from 
1965 to September 2001, where the U.S. was able to obtain Pakistan‘s cooperation only 
through their promise and their economic aid packages.  In the aftermath of the tragic 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. declared war on those responsible in Afghanistan. As a 
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result, the U.S. turned back again to their ―crucial ally‖105 Pakistan, sensing both a threat 
and an economic incentive to get its cooperation.106 Musharraf, the then president of 
Pakistan, accepted the U.S. conditions for providing support.  Washington desperately 
needed that move, although they could not predict the price.107 However, Musharraf and 
the U.S. again disregarded the public perception and proceeded with their plan. 
The U.S.-Pakistan cooperation under these coercive measures had fundamentally 
altered the game. The two players, from their previous interactions, had developed an 
intricate rationale that influences their decision. Additionally, the growing public 
influence through media and information technology accumulated a momentum that 
started to play a pivotal role in Pakistan‘s domestic politics.  The next stage will examine 
the game from 2001 onwards, assessing the impact of the players‘ rationale and the 
public perception on the game. 
E. STAGE THREE: FALLEN VEILS 
In this stage, we assume that not only is the player‘s rationale sufficient to play 
the moves in the game, but also that the public perception, laden with negative values, 
comes into play.  Additionally, we assume that the same negative perception began to 
interfere with the players‘ strategies and their ability to obtain favorable outcomes. 
Recently, President Zardari clarified that, ―Pakistan has paid an enormous price for its 
stand against terrorism.‖108 The anti-American sentiments have raised the costs 
associated with any pro-American strategy in Pakistan.  On the other hand, the U.S. is in 
no better situation, where the anti-Pakistan sentiments in the Congress, powerful lobbies 
and special-interest groups started to put pressure on the U.S. strategies. The benchmarks 
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and the preconditions on the U.S. aid is a good evidence of these negative perceptions.  
These perceptions and associated high costs reduced the political influence of both the 
players significantly. 
The U.S. policies in Afghanistan, coupled with ―the lack of strategic context of 
the war, incoherent war aims, insufficient resources, and poor execution, soon 
undermined the war effort‖109 and aggravated both the Afghan and Pakistan public. 
Thereafter, Pakistan suffered the worst spillover effect on her internal and external 
security as a result of the fight against terror. The Pakistani government‘s actions did not 
meet the public expectations. By the end of 2008, the public became pro-active when 
Musharraf transferred power to the newly elected civil government.   
1. Game Setup 
In this stage, the game will also be conducted as an incomplete information 
game.110 The goal of such a game is to capture the trends of the relation after the events 
of 9/11 and examine the weight of each element. The game will start with a description of 
the players‘ rationale of the game to facilitate evaluating their options. The assumptions 
and the rules will not be changed, while the cardinal values represent the higher stakes of 
the players. Additionally, to represent the negative perception effect, the perception value 
will be subtracted from both the players. 
The change in the cardinal values reflects the widened gap between the two allies 
and their divergent approaches, especially after the recent developments in their relations. 
The repeated calls in the U.S. Congress to restrict the U.S. aid to Pakistan and add more 
restraints are one example. On the other hand, the escalating anti-American sentiments 
inside Pakistan and calls to cut cooperation clarify the declining level of tolerance on 
both sides.  Negative cardinal values were assigned to the options to show the negative 
‗Net Profit‘ of such options from the players‘ perspectives. 
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2. The Players Rationale 
a. U.S. Rationale of Mistrust. The U.S. assumptions are as follows: 
1) Pakistan is an untrusted ally who misused the money provided 
through AID and diverted it to advance her own regional 
interests.111 
2) ―Pakistan‘s hostile relationship with India impinges on short and 
long-term American interests.‖112 To the U.S., Pakistan is an 
untrusted tactical ally vs. India, which is a growing regional 
hegemon.113 
3) Pakistan-China military cooperation is not acceptable and will 
jeopardize regional stability.114  
4) The U.S. view that ―Pakistan‘s role as a moderate Islamic or 
Muslim state has been transformed.‖115  The ideological clash is 
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dominant between liberal democratic Pakistan vs. the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan.116 
5) ―Pakistan poses a greater threat in regard to transnational terrorism 
than does Afghanistan.‖117 
6) Pakistan is an unpredictable partner to the U.S., where ―Pakistan‘s 
difficult political transition and serious economic crisis will make 
it an erratic ally.‖118 
7) The covert relations between Pakistan and the radical groups is 
counter-productive and jeopardizes its ability to maintain stability 
in Afghanistan.  This is considered to be a vital element for U.S. 
national security and regional strategy. This rationale augments the 
U.S. believe that Pakistan will not eliminate Taliban/al Qaeda 
sanctuaries or develop a rapid political solution for the governance 
problems in the tribal regions. 
8) The Pakistani government is incompetent and incabable of 
handling its critical security situation. ―The Pakistani government 
is not likely to develop a workable political-military strategy and 
doctrine to deal with counterinsurgency in the near term, or to 
build the necessary public support.‖ 
9) The spillover effects inside Pakistan of the counter-terrorism 
efforts in Afghanistan are extremely dangerous and a warning sign 
for the U.S., coming as they do from a nuclear-capable ally.  The 
―Increased U.S. and NATO military efforts in southern 
Afghanistan may generate a spillover into adjacent areas of 
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Pakistan.‖119 Furthermore, ―[e]xtremism could well spread into 
other parts of Pakistan as provincial issues are not addressed and 
economic pressures increase.‖120  
b. Pakistan’s Rationale of Betrayal. Pakistan‘s assumptions are as 
follows:121 
1) U.S. always backed dictators and military regimes.  Many 
historians believe that the U.S. military and arms aid had 
devastating setbacks on democracy in Pakistan. 
2) The U.S. imposed sanctions during war with India in 1965. That 
was an eye opener and a reminder for the Pakistani ruling elite to 
sort out their domestic issues. 
3) Pakistan became the springboard for American sponsored Jihad 
against the Soviet Union after 1979.  Afghanistan was converted 
into a graveyard of the Soviet empire122 by the combined strategy 
of Pakistani military, American weapons and Saudi investment. 
4) The Americans left the area after the demise of Soviet Union and 
the end of the Cold War.  Pakistan was left alone to suffer the 
consequences of the void in Afghanistan through import of 
weapons, drugs, refugees and instability on its Western Border. 
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5) The whole atmosphere was further complicated after the U.S. 
imposed the worst military and economic sanctions against 
Pakistan‘s nuclear program. This was the third betrayal and a key 
factor in creating distrust between the two allies. 
6) Pakistan sees the same historical relationship trend starting again 
after 9/11. The U.S. is advancing its interests in Afghanistan by 
expanding the India-specific strategy. 
7) Pakistan looks at the U.S. as an unreliable ally who repeatedly 
[ab]used Pakistan to advance its interests in the region. 
8) Pakistanis remember the marginal relationship from the ―most 
allied ally‖ to the most sanctioned ally of the United States.123 
9) Pakistan believes that it is time for the U.S. to start compensating 
her for all those lost years of abandonment and neglect. 
10) Despite the U.S. aid to Pakistan, she is more inclined toward its 
geopolitical existential threats, which is worth more than the aid 
provided by the U.S. 
11) Pakistan feels abandoned and neglected again; she has lost her 
geopolitical weight in the region to her traditional adversary. The 
repeated association with the U.S. has undermined Pakistan‘s 
legitimacy in her own people‘s eyes and within the Muslim world. 
12) The image of the Pakistan military to its population reached its 
lowest ebb when the U.S. violated its sovereignty by conducting a 
military operation inside Pakistan to kill Osama Bin Laden. 
13) The spillover effects of the U.S. war in Afghanistan are devastating 
for Pakistan and the U.S. should realize and compensate for her 
cooperation. 
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14) The growing Indian influence in Afghanistan not only raises 
Pakistan‘s security concerns but also undermines broader U.S. 
efforts in the Af-Pak region for achieving stability.  The trend also 
signals the threat of a new Kashmir on Pakistan‘s western borders. 
15) The supply route provided to the U.S. and coalition forces are vital 
in a way that can put her in a better bargaining situation. 
16) Years of sanctions, under the Pressler Amendment, are still alive in 
the hearts and minds of the Pakistani people and leadership. 
Pakistan saw years of democracy and progress during those years, 
but Pressler created a feeling of strong distrust and betrayal against 
the United States.  
17) The factor of mistrust keeps increasing due to events like 
continuous drone attacks and other operations inside Pakistan. 
3. The Players’ Options 
a. Pakistan’s Options 
1) Best Choice: To enjoy a free ride as compensation of her devotion. 
This option will assume a cardinal value of 3. 
2) Next Best Choice: Both the players cooperate with each other to 
advance their respective national interests. Pakistan feels that the 
U.S. should recognize her strategic interests as an equal ally and 
work with her to advance them. In this case, both players provide 
adequate cost to gain mutual benefit. This option will assume a 
cardinal value of 1. 
3) Next Choice: To be the loser of this game, where she has to 
provide all the benefits to the U.S. At the same time, she receives 
inadequate benefit or none at all. The costs associated with this 
option entails confronting the spillover effect of the U.S. strategy 
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in Afghanistan, which has a serious destabilizing effect on 
Pakistan. This option will be credited a cardinal value of -2. 
4) Worst Option: The mutual defect, where both players stop their 
interaction. For Pakistan, this option carries more challenges, 
where Pakistan will suffer vital consequences, both economically 
and politically. This option will assume a cardinal value of -3. 
b. U.S. Options 
1) Best Choice: Pakistan complies with the U.S. wishes and follows 
its will without any exchange from the U.S. The U.S. views 
Pakistan as an untrustworthy tactical ally who is eager to take 
advantage of America‘s political and economic status to advance 
her own regional interests. The U.S. blames Pakistan for what has 
happened in Afghanistan, and for all those threats posed by 
regional terrorists and Islamic radicals. The U.S. looks at Pakistan 
as an ungrateful ally who historically cheated the U.S. Pakistan 
took advantage of its relation with the U.S. to support an Islamist 
ideology.  Above all, Pakistan took advantage of the U.S. to 
develop nuclear weapons, which the U.S. will not tolerate within a 
religiously motivated state.  So Pakistan has to comply with the 
U.S. and pay back its debt to the U.S.. This option will assume a 
cardinal value of 3. 
2) Next Best Choice: Both players cooperate with each other to 
advance their respective national interests. From the American 
perspective, Pakistan should cooperate without asking for any sort 
of payback from the U.S. Additionally, the U.S. is not willing to 
tailor its foreign policy objectives in the region with respect to the 
threat perception of Pakistan. In this case, both players provide 
adequate cost to gain mutual benefit. This option will assume a 
cardinal value of 2. 
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3) Next Choice: To extend hands of cooperation, while Pakistan 
defects and become the game sucker. From the American 
perspective, this is out of the question and unacceptable.  Pakistan 
has to comply with the U.S. designs. However, the U.S.‘ high 
stakes in Pakistan and Afghanistan make it more open to 
unwillingly cooperate with Pakistan to achieve its goals and 
advance its own interests. The U.S. understands the vital 
importance of Pakistan‘s military and the public to eliminate both 
the terrorist sanctuaries and religious extremism. Such cooperation 
will be impermanent. This option will assume a cardinal value of 
1. 
4) Worst Option: The mutual defect; will relieve the U.S. of any 
financial commitment to Pakistan.  Additionally, it will enable the 
U.S. to pursue different regional strategies that satisfy its 
objectives.  The U.S. can change this outcome and obtain 
Pakistan‘s compliance through the international community and 
the United Nations Security Council without any direct 
involvement or commitment. This will allow the U.S. to push India 
deep into Afghanistan and avoid mediation between the two 
countries. However, this will also undermine the U.S. efforts in its 
fight against terror by granting the radicals a pause that will enable 
them to rebuild their capabilities, besides offsetting the gains 
achieved by the U.S. in Afghanistan.  It will also cut the coalition 
forces‘ supply routes through Pakistan. This option will assume a 
cardinal value of -1. Table 11 demonstrates the players‘ payoffs in 
its general form. Subsequently, Table 12 reveals the cardinal 
values assigned to the players‘ payoffs. Finally, Table 13 illustrates 
the game movement diagram.  
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(B-C-P+I, B-C-P+I) (B-C-P-I, B-I) 
Defect 
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(B-I, B-C-P-I) (C-P-I, C-P-I) 
 




Coop.  Defect 
U.S. 
Coop. (2, 1)  (1, 3)   
      
Defect (3, -2)  (-1, -3)   
 












Coop.  Defect 
U.S. 
Coop. (2, 1)  (1, 3)   
      
Defect (3, -2)  (-1, -3)   
 




The movement diagram suggests that none of the players has a dominant strategy. 
The game has three Nash equilibrium points. Two are pure strategy equilibrium points (1, 
3) and (3, -2), while the third (2, 1) is a mixed strategy equilibrium.  The likely outcome 
is (2, 1).  Both players have the incentives to defect from the likely outcome point to 
improve their payoffs.  Nash arbitration point is (2, 1), which will be calculated 
thereafter. Game calculations are shown in the Appendix. 
4. Observation 
The game without communication revealed that both players do not have a 
dominant strategy that would eventually lead to the equilibrium point. In this game, the 
strategic move analysis reveals that Pakistan can secure a better payoff by starting with a 
defect strategy. She can secure better outcomes by communicating her intentions to the 
U.S. and end up in a better negotiation stand with a potential payoff of (1, 3). Pakistan 
does not have a threat or a promise that can be used against the U.S., nor a combination. 
On the other hand, the U.S. also has a first move advantage where she can secure better 
payoffs by using the defect strategy. Neither the threat nor the promise options are 
available to the U.S.  Although both players have a first move advantage, they neither 
have the threat nor the promise option available to support their move. This suggests that 
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the players cannot improve their payoffs by using the strategic moves. The likely 
outcome will remain the best payoffs the players can secure. 
The security level analysis shows that Pakistan‘s security level is Y=-2 and her 
game value is -2.  Pakistan‘s prudential strategy is cooperation, where she should play a 
pure cooperation strategy to maintain her security level.  The U.S. has a pure prudential 
strategy to cooperate whenever Pakistan defects.  Their value of the game is 1 and their 
security level is X=1. 
Pakistan does not have a pure equalizing strategy. She has to play a mixed 
strategy with 2/3 of the time cooperation and 1/3 defection to equalize the U.S. Her game 
value will be 1.66667.  For Pakistan, the equalizing strategy provides better payoffs than 
likely outcome or Nash arbitration.  On the other hand, the U.S. also has to play a mixed 
strategy, with 1/3 of the time cooperation and 2/3 defection to equalize Pakistan. The 
U.S. game value will be -1. The U.S. is in a better situation and need not use such 
strategy to equalize Pakistan.  Therefore, the players‘ status quo is (1, -2) and Nash 
arbitration is (2, 1).  Nash arbitration can be reached by playing pure cooperation strategy 
by both players. 
F. STAGE FOUR  
The fourth stage is the description of the recent development of a bilateral 
relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan after the friction over the issues of Operation 
Neptune Spear, Dallas Airport and the Raymond Davis incident.  The U.S. intention to 
drawdown their troops from Afghanistan by 2014 refreshes the rationale of betrayal by 
Pakistan amid radicalization and rising Indian influence in the region.  An indication of 
such intentions was demonstrated after the recent inflation in the U.S. aid program during 
the current phase of their relationship. 
The game at this stage is in succession to the previous stage. It will be conducted 
with perfect information, where we assume that the players‘ rationales and their previous 
engagements play a critical role in their decisions. The previous knowledge provides an 
information set that transforms the game.  We assume that both players start to realize the 
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importance of the public perception in the game. Additionally, at least one of the players 
has the ability to observe the other player‘s move and strategy. Hence, his choice will be 
conditional on the other player‘s move. 
1. The Game of Perfect Information 
Since the game is conducted with information about the strategies, it is considered 
to be a game with perfect information.124 In such a game, the players conduct their moves 
according to their historical analysis as sets of moves or separate games. Each move is 
considered to be conducted according to one player, and conditional to the other player‘s 
move.  Each set is called a sub-game.125 Therefore, to solve the game, it is required to 
find the sub-games that satisfy Nash equilibrium refinement rules.126 Thereafter, we find 
the perfect sub-game equilibrium that is the likely outcome of the game. This is 
conducted according to the tree diagram, backward reasoning and from the perspective of 
both the players. 
2. The U.S. Game 
U.S. moves first.  To solve the game, the concept of the imperfect game will be 
used to find Nash equilibrium points by transforming the game from perfect information 
game to simultaneous game. The tree diagram as shown in Figure 8 represents the game 
when the U.S. moves first with the players‘ payoffs.  The information set expanded the 
player‘s strategic options from two strategies to four strategies.  
                                                 
124 Fink, Gates and Humes, Game Theory Topics: Incomplete Information, Repeated Games, and N-
Player Games, 69 




Figure 8. The Tree Diagram of Pak-U.S. Final Game and Players‘ Payoffs 
The strategic form shown in Table 14 represents the payoffs of the players after 
transforming the game to a simultaneous game. To analyze the players‘ options, a 
movement analysis will identify the best strategies from each player‘s perspective. 
 
Table 14.   The U.S. Game Strategic Form and the Players‘ Payoffs (stage 4) 
 
Pakistan 
Coop, Coop Coop, Defect Defect, Coop Defect, Defect 
U.S. 
Coop. (2, 1) (2, 1) (1, 3) (1, 3) 
















 The movement diagram shows that we have three Nash equilibrium sub-games, 
corresponding with the following strategies. First, [Defect U.S., (Coop Pak, Coop Pak)], 
Second, [Coop U.S., (Defect Pak, Defect Pak)], Third, [Defect U.S., (Defect Pak, Coop Pak)].  
From this, we can see that we have only two Nash sub-games, and only one of them is 
Nash sub-game perfect.  
The first and the third are Nash sub-game perfect.   Although the second sub-
game contains an embedded threat, it is a non-credible threat, which goes against 
Pakistan‘s best interest if it was used.  Therefore, the U.S. has a dominant strategy to 
defect.   
3. Pakistan Game.  
Pakistan moves first. The tree diagram shown in Figure 9 represents the game when 
Pakistan moves first with the players‘ payoffs. The players‘ strategies and their payoffs 
are represented in Table 15.  
 





















Coop., Coop. (2, 1) (1, 3)  
Coop., Defect (2, 1) (-1, -3) 
Defect, Coop. (3, -2) (1, 3) 
Defect, Defect (3, -2) (-1, -3) 
 
The movement analysis shows that the game has three Nash Equilibria Sub-
Games.  First, [Coop U.S., Coop U.S., (Defect Pak)]. Second, [Defect U.S., Coop U.S., (Defect 
Pak)]. Third, [Defect U.S., Defect U.S., (Coop Pak)].  
The former two games are Nash Sub-Game perfect games while the final/later 
game is not Nash Sub-Game perfect, the U.S. threat embedded on the last Sub-Game is 
not credible, since it is against the U.S.‘ best interests, unless the U.S. accepts reducing 
its payoffs to hurt Pakistan, which is considered to be an irrational move in this respect. 
4. Observations 
 The final game clarifies the clash/conflict of interests between the U.S. and 
Pakistan. This clash of interests was exacerbated over the years. The public perception 
element in the game has increased the cost borne by both the players and created a 
disabling environment affecting the implementation of their strategies.  The two players 
have decided to adopt a ‗Defect Strategy‘ to maximize their payoffs, or reduce their costs. 
This situation causes a severe deterioration in the U.S.-Pakistan relation.  The U.S. failure 
to create a basis of long-term relations built on mutual interest with Pakistan has severely 
affected their relations. On the other hand, Pakistan‘s failure to address her critical issues 
both internally and regionally has put her in an interests‘ collision course with the U.S.  
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G. CONCLUSION 
The game theory represents the Pak-U.S. relations in four different stages. In the 
first three stages, the game of imperfect information was played.  This helped to capture 
and analyze the behavior of the U.S.-Pakistan relation and their strategic interactions over 
a period of time. The strategic form that was used previously helped to explain the 
available strategies for each player and expected payoffs.  Additionally, the game 
theoretical explanatory tool provided an important evaluation methodology.  It reveals 
that the trends in the U.S.-Pakistan relations, ever since they started, have completed a 
loop.  The game also clearly depicts the relation between its elements (C, B, I, P, NP). 
The net profit is measured in terms of economic and political influence and the state‘s 
ability to advance its interests. The benefits, however, are directly proportional to the 
public‘s perception. The public‘s perception in the game creates an enabling environment 
to increase the political influence and benefits. Therefore, public perception is also 
directly proportional to the political influence. 
The first stage describes the initial engagement of bilateral relations between the 
U.S. and Pakistan.  None of the players had a credible threat or promise.  The game 
reached the Nash equilibrium through mutual cooperation strategies. The second stage 
describes a one-side game where the U.S. played a Defect strategy and chose to 
disconnect its interests from those of Pakistan.  However, during the game, the U.S. 
maintained firm control and managed to obtain Pakistani cooperation through a promise.  
The third stage reveals that the game after 9/11 went to the 1
st
 stage once again. The 
relation trend in 2001 was similar to that of the period after 1947. However, the stakes 
were much higher this time and the players were more cautious in their approach. 
Although the U.S. strategy dominates the game, that does not give her an advantage to 
dictate new game rules. Pakistan could have secured better outcomes if she chose to 
defect and play with another player who could provide her better payoffs.  The fourth 
stage only demonstrates the recent development in the game and discusses available 
options for both the players. 
Further examination of the U.S. threat during 2001 reveals that U.S.-Pakistan 
relations ―had become marked by discord and distance.‖ The Bush Administration sought 
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to reduce the costs of any cooperation by initiating a credible threat127 to reduce their 
costs and obtain unconditional cooperation from Pakistan. This attitude of the U.S. 
increased the Pakistani suspicion that brought the element of distrust into play. 
The U.S. strategy to stabilize Afghanistan through Indian influence has increased 
Pakistan‘s fears. The introduction of India deep into Afghan affairs surfaced diverging 
goals between the U.S. and Pakistan. Additionally, applications of the U.S. strategies in 
Afghanistan had a negative impact on Pakistan‘s security and social structure. The 
spillover effects of the COIN efforts by the U.S. in Afghanistan aggravated the negative 
public perception and brought back the memories of betrayal. Pakistan views the U.S. as 
forcibly trying to secure its interests that are overshadowing Pakistan‘s own political 
precedence in the region. This is interpreted as a defection of all cooperation strategies 
implemented after 2001. 
The state of denial by the U.S. towards Pakistan‘s regional political issues 
magnifies the gap between the two countries. The U.S. double-standard policies are 
another issue. The U.S. keeps stressing the vital importance of Pakistan to their regional 
interests, while on the other hand it keeps increasing her rivals‘ capabilities. This attitude 
exacerbates the Pakistani fears that they will be next on the American dinner table. 
The game substantiates an urgent need to apply trust building measures to 
maintain mutual cooperation. If the U.S. is considering a stable and democratic Pakistan 
favorable to its foreign policy, then sincere efforts are required to address the public 
perception of Pakistan. The U.S. still has the ability to win the hearts and minds of the 
people of Pakistan, by the virtue of having a dominant strategy. A very remarkable study 
conducted by Andraby argues that the 2005 earthquake could be regarded as a ―quasi-
experiment.‖128  This would help the masses to interpret the effect of the earthquake on 
the Pakistani population‘s attitude towards the foreign elements.  The attitude difference 
                                                 
127 Some look at the U.S. 2001 threat as a credible threat, however, the game shows that in rational 
thinking it is a non-credible threat. 
128 Tahir Andrabi and Jishnu Das, ―In Aid we trust: Hearts and minds and the Pakistan Earthquake of 
2005,‖ The World Bank, Washington DC and Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, (September 2010), 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/uploads/mei/conference/andrabi-inaidwetrust.pdf, (accessed June 
10, 2011). 
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between the people who received the aid versus and those who were unable to receive the 
aid is a clear demonstration of the fact that the aid is a contributing factor to alter 
negative perceptions, provided it reaches the right people. Additionally, many polls 
provided credible evidence that the direct U.S. aid provided after the 2010 floods in 
Pakistan have remarkably improved the public perception in the affected regions of 
Pakistan. 
Pakistan needs military aid to overcome the terrorist threat imposed on the 
country these days. This aid should not be conditional on her ability to defeat the 
terrorists. It took the U.S. almost a decade to achieve some improvement in Afghanistan. 
The aid should be used to advance confidence not to stir fears. Additionally, the Pakistan 
security issue needs to be addressed. Any improvement in her security will improve the 
relations and will have a positive impact on the game. 
However, the U.S. needs primarily to consider the economic aid programs as a 
crucial tool to improve the Pakistani perception. The aid should reach its targets to 
accumulate inverse momentum that can defeat the anti-American sentiments. To achieve 
this end, the U.S. should not be hesitant to use all necessary measures. These measures 
should be directed into the delivery mechanisms rather than being restrictive measures 
that stir both suspicious and hatred. 
In the light of historical examples it could be analyzed that the U.S.-Pak 
relation had been caught in a frustration cycle.  In order to promote international peace 
and stability, it is pertinent to understand the consequences of proceeding in the same 
circle.  Therefore, the element of ―hope‖ is the only catalyst that could offset the effects 
of frustration and balance the bilateral relationship between the two countries for the next 
round of mutual interactions. 
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VI. PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES 
The game theoretical approach to the cost-benefit analysis of the ‗Pak-U.S. 
alliance in the fight against terrorism‘ suggests a cooperation strategy by both the players.  
It also highlights the benefits associated with the population-centric approach and leads 
towards enhanced cooperation. While the game theoretical solutions were based on 
strong assumptions, this chapter assesses the Pak-U.S. relationship from different 
perspectives including national interests, government/population perceptions about each 
other, and realities on the ground. U.S. aid is the base of all the discussion since it has 
played a major role in shaping perceptions and the relations between the two countries. 
Besides suggesting appropriate actions to bring favorable changes in existing perceptions, 
this chapter ends by proposing some measures to reduce irritants in interest alignment 
and promote more common goals and interests that assist in achieving a common 
platform to further the relationship. 
A. ROLE OF REGIONAL PLAYERS AND BALANCE OF POWER 
China, India, Iran, Russia, and Saudi Arabia are the key regional players that can 
exert an influential role in stabilizing Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Since every nation has a 
right to formulate and achieve its foreign policy goals and national interests, these players 
have also pursued their own interests and their contribution in stabilizing the region is not 
clearly visible. While China seeks to promote its narrowly defined interests in 
Afghanistan and maintains strong support for Pakistan, Iran is engaged in Afghanistan 
assisting stability and providing economic and democratic support.  Saudi Arabia, being a 
long-time ally to Pakistan, has shown consistent involvement in Afghanistan, renewing 
its commitment to promote stability and keeping its interests alive in the region. Russian 
perception in the region is shaped by many factors like U.S. dominance, the Central 
Asian Republics‘ (CAR) concerns, the viability of the Northern Distribution Network, 
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and import of extremism from Afghanistan129; Increasing Indian influence in 
Afghanistan poses a security dilemma for Pakistan. 
Pakistan, owing to its critical geo-strategic location and as a power-balancing 
actor in the region, needs to maintain cordial relations with all its neighbors without 
compromising on its own security.  With a historically unreliable and powerful enemy to 
the East, Pakistan cannot afford a hostile West.  While Indo-Pak relations hinge on the 
Kashmir issue, Afghanis share common cultural ties with Pakistan besides providing it 
with much-needed strategic depth.  Indian influence in Afghanistan is multi-faceted; 
India is not only increasing its physical presence and striving for access to CARs‘ 
energy/trade routes, but also fueling insurgency in Baluchistan to further destabilize 
Pakistan.  Therefore, Pakistan‘s security concerns are based on real facts where 
Afghanistan may become another ‗Kashmir‘130 for the two rivals, besides affecting the 
stabilization process in Afghanistan adversely. 
B. CONVERGING INTERESTS AND DIVERGING GOALS 
The U.S. approach towards India is not only in contradiction to its approach 
towards Pakistan but also undermines Pakistan‘s status in the region. On one side, the 
U.S. has refrained from becoming a party in settling the Kashmir issue and on the other it 
has kept silence on Indian influence in Afghanistan.  While India may serve as a bloc 
against China in the region and other U.S. interests, it should not be allowed to intervene 
in the interests of Pakistan or other entities in the region.  Since 2001, during the periods 
of most deep cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan, both have overlooked any major 
discrepancy in strategic objectives.  One of the biggest points of contention is the U.S. 
unwillingness to take sides with Pakistan and its rivalry with India.131  In addition, both 
 
                                                 
129 Shiza Shahid, ―Engaging Regional Players in Afghanistan Threats and Opportunities A Summary 
Paper from an Experts Roundtable Hosted by the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project,‖ Center For 
Strategic & International Studies (November 2009), 
http://csis.org/files/publication/091124_afghan_players_0.pdf, accessed September 11, 2011, 6. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Margaret Talev and Dion Nissenbaum, ―Obama Takes India‘s Side with U.N. Endorsement,‖ 
McClatchy Newspapers (Monday, November 8, 2010), October 19, 2011. 
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countries have different security priorities, with Pakistan concentrating efforts on her 
rivalry with India—an action that runs counter to U.S. interests on the Afghanistan 
border. 
These conflicts in interest alignment between Pakistan and the U.S. make it harder 
to reconcile an already frail alliance between the two countries.  Is there a way that these 
interests can converge?  How can the U.S. capitalize on those common objectives?  If the 
strategic objectives are different perhaps something could be done at the tactical level 
(what is happening on the ground) that will reduce the negative impact that these 
differences have on the population and the further repercussions that could be translated 
into pockets of safe haven to terrorist groups.  To offset these diverging interests at the 
strategic level, both countries have pinpointed and targeted tactical agreements like the 
permission to conduct U.S. drone strikes in some regions of the country. The difference 
in strategic objectives for both countries is not going to fade away in the near future but 
these differences could be overlooked to find a common ground of cooperation.  
However, for attaining a strategic relationship, the larger objectives and greater interests 
should be given priority over short-term goals and limited tactical gains. 
C. PLANNING FOREIGN AID: A WICKED PROBLEM  
If the perceptions do not match the realities or the needs of the population, any 
formulation of a strategy for foreign aid disbursement could fail. Social perception is the 
key to constructing the social reality of the populations.  The perception of the different 
stakeholders involved in the assignment and distribution of foreign aid in Pakistan shapes 
the social reality.  Before statistically discussing the perceptions, let us analyze the 
different dilemmas faced in planning foreign aid by utilizing a model created by Horst W. 
J. Rittel and Melvin W. Webber, who term these problems ―Wicked Problems.‖ These 
are problems that cannot be definitely described, there is no objective definition of what 
is fair and there is not a definitive optimal solution.132  The authors provide the following 
distinguishing characteristics for aid planning problems, which would enhance 
understanding of the prevailing perceptions and realities of the two nations. 
                                                 
132 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning (Berkeley: 
Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of California, 1973). 
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1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem. The issue with 
foreign aid and its disbursement is that the different stakeholders have 
different ideas of what the problem is and the solution should be.  Is the 
problem that basic human services are not reaching the population? Is the 
problem that the U.S. aid is being channeled systematically? For didactic 
purposes, the problem statement on foreign aid as a wicked problem is: 
What is the future of U.S. foreign aid?  
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule. The problem solving process 
ends when resources are depleted. The problem with this statement and 
foreign aid is that the recipients of this aid will continue trying to solve the 
problem.  With the U.S. tradition of fluctuating patterns on foreign aid 
policy and availability of funds, what is a solution that will mitigate 
resource depletion? 
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false but good-or-bad. 
With the variety of stakeholders, from donors and recipients of foreign 
aid, the United Nations, Non-Governmental Organizations, and the IMF 
what is good for one could be bad for the other.  Are these stakeholders 
taking into account the needs of the population and treating them as one of 
the main stakeholders or are they planning in a vacuum or mirror imaging?  
4. No immediate and ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem. 
Even though there is no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem, 
the United States should focus on what works, what needs improvement 
and what needs to be examined.  Instead of measuring outputs (e.g., wells 
and schools being built), there should be a focus on the outcome, is there 
governance and is the country stable? 
5. Every solution to a wicked problem has consequences. The 




implementation of a solution have intended or unintended consequences 
that must be dealt with accordingly.  Once you disburse aid you cannot 
take it back to readjust it. 
6. Wicked problems do not have a set of potential solutions. Every 
stakeholder has a different solution set depending on what is their purpose 
and their mission.  Synchronizing these different approaches to maximize 
the efficiency of the disbursement of aid may prove to be extremely 
difficult.  Furthermore, these solutions must be tailored to affect the 
population and not to enrich key players within the recipient‘s 
government. 
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique. With foreign aid there is 
not a solution template that could be applied to the receiving country.  
Every country is different and what is good for Pakistan might not be good 
for Columbia. In addition, even within Pakistan, a good solution for 
Waziristan might not be a good solution for FATA. 
8. Every wicked problem can be a symptom of another problem. A 
misdiagnosed symptom might attribute an effect to the wrong cause. 
Furthermore, a correlation does not automatically mean causality.  
9. The causes of a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways. 
There are economic, social and political complexities that contribute to 
wicked problems.  What makes it harder to deal with is that this maze of 
bureaucratic, legal and community intricacies will have a different 
interpretation depending on the stakeholder‘s prism through which they 
observe the issue.  
10. The planner (designer) has no right to be wrong. Since there is no 
ultimate test for a solution set when dealing with wicked problems, a 
planner is not in the business of formulating hypotheses.   Stakeholders 
expect designers to get things right. In addition, there is not a perfect 
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solution package; therefore, making a mistake, admitting it and correcting 
it is not a sign of weakness, it should be considered a sign of strength. 
D. PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES 
The fluctuating aid flows, and the divergence in the interests, objectives and goals 
of the two allies has given rise to conflicting perceptions and realities between Pakistan 
and the United States about each other and in the fight against terrorism. These 
perceptions could be categorized into more specific groups like the U.S. perception of 
Pakistan and the country‘s efforts towards defeating terrorism, Pakistan‘s perception of 
the U.S. and its true intentions, the Pakistani population‘s perception of their own 
government and of the U.S., and the global perception regarding the PAK-U.S. relations 
in general and their current alliance specifically. 
1. U.S. Perception of Pakistan.  
The U.S. population‘s favorability ratings of Pakistan have hit an all-time low in 
2011, with only 18% of Americans looking favorably upon the country as revealed in 
Figure 10. These views are probably from Pakistan‘s association in the media with 
international terrorism.  Furthermore, to put things in perspective, only Iran, North Korea 
and Afghanistan have less favorable ratings than Pakistan.133  This poll was conducted 
before Osama bin Laden‘s killing in Pakistan; therefore, it would be safe to say that this 







                                                 
133 Julie Ray and Rajesh Srinivasan, ―Pakistanis More Sour on U.S. After Bin Laden Raid,‖ GALLUP 
(May 20, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/146090/iran-north-korea-americans-least-favorite-




Figure 10.  Pakistan‘s Favorability Ratings 
 
The trend depicted in the first graph shows that Americans‘ views on Pakistan are 
closely linked to their views on Afghanistan.  An assessment from a former senior U.S. 
government official, speaking of the U.S. government‘s perception of Pakistan says, 
―Pakistan is the most dangerous country in the world today. All of the nightmares of the 
twenty-first century come together in Pakistan: nuclear proliferation, drug smuggling, 
military dictatorship, and above all, international terrorism.‖134  While the face value of 
this statement suggests grave concerns for the audience, it does not portray the reality 
since none of these factors qualify to label Pakistan as ‗most dangerous‘ in the presence 
of North Korea, Mexico, Burma and Afghanistan for nuclear proliferation, drug 
smuggling, military dictatorship, and international terrorism, respectively.  
                                                 
134 Kronstadt, Library of Congress and Congressional Research Service, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, 
102. 
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1. Pakistan’s Perception of the U.S. 
The Pakistani population‘s disapproval of the U.S. leadership is also extremely 
low. In a poll conducted in 2011 as shown in Figure 11, the Pakistani approval rating for 
the American leadership was at an all-time (since Gallup has been conducting these polls) 
low of 10%.  Furthermore, after the raid on Bin Laden, 64% of Pakistanis who were 
aware of this operation had a more negative view of the U.S..135 This is partly because of 
their belief that neither Pakistani intelligence nor the government was aware of OBL‘s 
presence in Pakistan. 
 
Figure 11. U.S. Favorability Ratings 
 
The Pakistani government perception of U.S. intentions has been worsening with 
events like the execution of two Pakistanis in the city of Lahore by a CIA contractor this 
year, the increasing number of drone attacks in Pakistan‘s tribal regions, and the U.S. raid 
inside Pakistan to kill bin Laden in May.136 Foreign aid has been used to manage 
perceptions at the government level but these changes in perception are not being seen in 
the Pakistani population.   
 
 
                                                 
135 Ray and Srinivasan, Pakistanis More Sour on U.S. After Bin Laden Raid, October 21, 2011. 
136  Peter Bergen and Michael Mazarr, ―U.S.-Pakistan: Divorce is Not an Option,‖ Cable News 
Network (September 1, 2011), accessed October 21, 2011. 
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2. Pakistani Population’s Perception of Their Own and that of the U.S. 
Government 
In 2008, 62% of Pakistanis did not have confidence in their own government and 
the same number of people suspected that their leadership was leading Pakistan down the 
wrong path as depicted in Figure 12.137  In 2011, the percentage of optimists increased 
to 26%; however,  the Bin Laden episode has brought it down considerably.  On the other 
hand, the U.S. leadership enjoyed a similar approval rating among Pakistanis in 2008, 
which rose to 28% in 2011.  However, the percentage has declined sharply after Bin 




Figure 12. Population Perception 
 
E. CONCEPTUAL BLOCKS BLURRING PERCEPTIONS 
One of the issues with international assistance is that, with so many constraints, it 
becomes a wicked problem trying to prioritize how to disburse foreign aid.  Furthermore, 
with the troubles that affect many regions in the world, it is extremely hard to pinpoint 
                                                 
137 Retrieved from the Gallup World View database http://www.gallup.com/poll/113737/pakistanis-
give-new-civilian-leadership-low-marks-far.aspx accessed on October 27, 2011. 
 96 
what the problems are and how to affect a positive change.  This becomes wicked 
problem territory when United States foreign aid can be one of the resources that could 
save a fragile state.  How can the United States, from policymakers to USAID officers in 
the field, disengage from the conceptual blocks that are affecting its perception of what 
the true dilemma is and develop strategies that enable it to develop better solutions to 
wicked problems?   
As a tool to cope with creativity in understanding and developing solutions to 
wicked problems, James L. Adams book, Conceptual Blockbusting, A Guide to Better 
Ideas, will be utilized for this discussion.138  The different conceptual blocks that might 
pose a challenge to pinpointing what the true wicked problem could be are perceptual 
blocks, emotional blocks and cultural and environmental blocks.  These different blocks 
have a detrimental effect on the perception ultimately affecting the reality on the ground.  
Even though the author also mentions intellectual and expressive blocks, and alternate 
thinking languages, these will not be addressed in this thesis.  
1. Perceptual Blocks 
According to Adams, a perceptual block is a barrier that prevents problem solvers 
from recognizing what the real problem is or the information necessary to resolve the 
problem.  The first perceptual block for the people dealing with foreign aid is difficulty 
isolating the problem.  Is the problem the security apparatus of the recipient of the foreign 
aid, is it unattended grievances in the country‘s population, or is it the presence of 
terrorist groups in a specific province?  Spending more time in isolating the problem 
might shed light on possible simple solutions.  The second block is drawing the 
boundaries of a problem too narrowly; in other words, the framing of a wicked problem 
has influence over possible solution sets.  When the constraints on defining a dilemma 
are eased, it allows for multidisciplinary considerations in the diplomatic, information, 
military or economic realms instead of only applying a foreign aid solution to a wicked 
problem.  In addition, this is a cultural block that says ―throwing money at the problem 
                                                 
138 James L. Adams, Conceptual Blockbusting: A Guide to Better Ideas, 4th ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Perseus Pub., 2001), 220. 
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will solve it.‖ Finally, the tendency to mirror image or assume that all parties involved 
are going to think and act like you will obstructs the ability to have sensitivity for the 
perspective of others.  In other words, it is important to take into consideration what are 
the needs of the population and put yourself in other people‘s shoes, see what they see, 
hear what they hear, and feel what they feel.   
2. Emotional Blocks 
Some examples of emotional blocks are risk averseness, inability to embrace 
uncertainty and judging instead of innovating.  Security concerns with threats like 
terrorism make U.S. government foreign aid a risky business.  What this does is put the 
focus of what the problem is in the national or foreign security realm instead of realizing 
that other problems could have more devastating effects within a country‘s population.  
The foreign aid stakeholders are not willing to make a ―mistake‖ and invest in a problem 
that fails to engage the interest of the donor country. 
Accepting uncertainty could make it easier for stakeholders to develop their goals 
in synchronicity to create more reliable problem identification and solutions.  When 
stakeholders work together, the negative impact of uncertainty is mitigated because an 
atmosphere of trust is created.  Furthermore, another example of an emotional block is 
judging instead of innovating.  Stakeholders need to be more sympathetic with the ideas 
of other organizations and their take on what the dilemma is and what innovative 
solutions could address the wicked problem. 
3. Cultural and Environmental Blocks 
The United States government has trouble understanding other cultures and this 
inattentiveness to cultural factors hampers creativity, not only in identifying problems but 
also in finding solutions.  Our culture of having an ―everybody should be like me‖ 
mentality and authoritative attitudes could alienate some stakeholders that bring a fresh 
and innovative perspective into the problem identification and solving process.  The idea 
is to have as many stakeholders as possible, with the authority dispersed to create a 
shared strategy that will give everybody involved a sense of ownership and commitment. 
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Cultural and environmental blocks could hamper the ability of considering outside 
options and make the so-called experts have a one-dimensional view of the world.  
Stakeholders need to have empathy for others to be able to have the imagination and 
creativity to work in wicked problem territory.  Finally, liberating organizations from 
these conceptual blocks will help them see the uniqueness in every problem.  This will 
lead to the development of innovative solutions instead of applying a ―cookie cutter‖ 
solution template to every situation. 
F. CHANGING PERCEPTIONS THROUGH MICRO-ALLIANCES 
To change negative perceptions to positive ones, the United States could 
channelize those foreign aid funds via micro-alliances at the population level using 
entrepreneurship and innovation.  One example of a successful world systems changing 
solutions organization is Ashoka.  Moreover, with significant budget constraints, Ashoka 
has been able to stimulate a global community that makes all citizens powerful change-
makers helping manage the perceptions with a more positive reality.  One of the hardest 
parts of foreign aid is measuring the effectiveness and the impact that this money is 
having on the population that is supposed to benefit from the aid (to include their 
perceptions).  Conducting a critical examination of non-military spending and the 
contribution it has made in achieving U.S. strategic objectives and managing Pakistani-
U.S. perceptions, we could say that these funds have been either wrongly utilized or are 
not reaching the intended citizens. 
Decentralized disbursement of funds at provincial levels or even further 
decentralizing into various subsectors would be effective in bringing substantial changes.  
The current method of disbursing foreign aid leaves these resources in the hands of 
corrupt government officials, which means that the population‘s grievances are not being 
met.  Therefore, the strategy should be to generate social entrepreneurship to create a 
self-sustaining mechanism that will eventually erode the vicious cycle of foreign aid 
dependence.  However, to be good stewards of foreign aid, each sector and sub-sector 
should have centralized accountability at the USAID level. 
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G. MANAGING PERCEPTIONS BY KNOWING AND INFLUENCING 
REALITIES 
Collaboration could be an effective strategy in dealing with the unproductive 
system currently in place to disburse foreign aid.  When we, as consumers, pay for a 
product or a service, we want to see results.  The same concept should be applied to the 
granting of foreign aid, so the government can be a good steward of the U.S. taxpayers‘ 
money, which in turn can have positive effects on managing perception in the U.S. Social 
entrepreneurship demonstrated how people can help themselves instead of creating a 
dependency on foreign aid, which will turn into a vicious cycle.  However, how can 
collaboration streamline and mobilize the resources so that they can reach the intended 
population?  The different stakeholders must have a say on how aid is spent.  With the 
current system, the money falls into the hands of corrupt governments that do not fulfill 
the needs of their population. 
One of the issues with collaboration is the problem of coordinating and 
synchronizing efforts with so many stakeholders that have a say on where the aid goes.  
However, Web 2.0 platforms to include mobile phones, text messaging, and other social 
networks could bring together a large network of volunteers, stakeholders and 
apprehensive institutions to include foreign and domestic donors.  Ushahidi is an example 
of how these technologies have proven to be effective in tying the geospatial element and 
information collection to the actual disaster assistance resources on the ground in the 
Haiti Earthquake relief effort.  Figure 13 is an example depicting how collaboration and 
foreign aid might work together. 
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Figure 13. Collaboration and Foreign Aid Mechanism 
 
This flow charts starts with real-time reporting from the people at the local level. 
The stakeholders at the grassroots level, the people that are aware of the actual realities of 
the population, provide awareness of these platforms to report any grievances.  These 
reports go into an online data bank were in which the United States agency and other 
donors in charge of providing the aid have access to this data.  These reports are 
prioritized geospatially and resources are mobilized by, with and through volunteers and 
NGOs that have been vetted by the U.S. interagency channels.  Donors like to see their 
money in action, so some of the projects funded by ―crowd sourcing‖ could be filmed and 
aired on a platform like You Tube for better transparency in the process. 
The U.S. could develop strategies to cope with managing perceptions and 
changing realities with creativity, systems thinking, entrepreneurship and innovation, and 
collaborative problem solving and innovation.  First, in using creativity it is important to 
devise strategies that will help in getting rid of conceptual blocks that might pose a 
challenge to pinpoint what the true problem could be.  Some of these are perceptual 
blocks, emotional blocks and cultural and environmental blocks.  Second, in systems 
thinking developing a causal loop diagram is an excellent aid in visualizing how the 
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different variables or separate problems relate and affect each other (Chapter IV).  
Furthermore, doing this will facilitate pinpointing intervention points to influence the 
system in a positive manner.  Third, entrepreneurship and innovation creates a self-
sustaining mechanism that will eventually erode the vicious cycle of foreign aid 
dependence. 
In conclusion, with so many stakeholders involved with foreign aid, it is safe to 
say that it will fall in wicked problem territory.  There is no consensus on which 
problems or grievances need to be addressed or how to prioritize meeting those needs.  
Finally, with so many constraints, limited resources could cause competition for these 
resources and conflict within the different stakeholders.  Collaboration is an excellent 
strategy for making foreign aid effective, viable and transparent.  This is what will 
change the realities on the ground, which will in turn influence perception. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Pakistan-United States relationship has witnessed several ups and downs in 
the last six decades.  One of the most important factor affecting Pak-U.S. ties has been 
U.S. aid.  The aid has been used to achieve the U.S.‘ varying foreign policy objectives 
including, but not limited to, containing the spread of communism, Soviet expansion, 
China, and terrorism/extremism in the region.  However, withdrawal of aid on more than 
one occasion (e.g., alliance with China, wars with India, Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, and nuclear issues) forced Pakistan to explore alternate venues to serve her 
national interests.  While the flow of U.S. aid provided Pakistan with tools to serve both 
her own and the U.S. interests in the region, abrupt withdrawal of the same and 
imposition of sanctions, at various times and for various reasons, created a negative 
perception about the U.S. within Pakistan. 
It would not be incorrect to say that the import and spread of extremism, drugs, 
and weapons in Pakistan through Afghanistan, in the post-Soviet withdrawal period, is 
the result of the U.S. disappearance from the scene. This is also true that this mega event 
has contributed significantly towards the current state of Pakistan.  The sourest point 
remains that the U.S. recycled its relations with Pakistan at regular intervals to suit its 
own national interests without paying much attention to its implications for Pakistan‘s 
geo-political, socio-economic, and domestic situation.  Pakistan has been graded, at 
various times, from as high as the ‗most allied ally‘ to as low as ‗most dangerous‘ state, 
besides spending more time facing military/economic sanctions than actually receiving 
assistance. The U.S. government has never been focused on Pakistan‘s long-term stability 
and prosperity.139 Instead, the emphasis has mostly remained on achieving short-term 
goals. 
The U.S. strategy towards Pakistan, even in the post-9/11 period, remained far 
from focusing on long-term relations. The same pro-military U.S. approach is reflected in 
most of the financial assistance that the U.S. has provided to Pakistan since its inception. 
                                                 
139 Craig Cohen, A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, 2007), 128, viii (preface). 
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―The vast majority of U.S. assistance to Pakistan since September 11, 2001, however, has 
not been directed to Pakistan‘s underlying fault lines, but to specific, short-term 
counterterrorism objectives that focus particularly on the western border and on 
Afghanistan.‖140 Thereby, United States has undermined its broader strategic goals in 
Pakistan while addressing immediate issues like al Qaeda and the Taliban, implying that 
the U.S. thinking revolves around dealing with the symptoms and not the root causes of 
extremism and terrorism.141  The cost-benefit analysis of the Pak-U.S. alliance, in the 
fight against terrorism from 2001–2011, suggests a pattern of pro-military approach from 
the U.S. towards Pakistan that has not only failed in achieving U.S. objectives but has 
also strengthened already existing anti-U.S. sentiments in Pakistan and expanded the 
extremists‘ base. The diminishing U.S. influence in Pakistan is another proof of faulty 
U.S. policies towards the country.  
The U.S. claims of providing considerable financial assistance to Pakistan is only 
partially valid since most of this assistance is either severely conditioned or provided in 
lieu of services offered by Pakistan. While the major portion of the assistance is 
security/military related, less assistance is directed to addressing the huge population 
base.  Pakistan is also not methodical in fund management.  An insight into the current 
U.S. military/economic assistance to Pakistan reveals several drawbacks in fund 
appropriations and management including, but not limited to, underutilization, 
mismanagement, invisibility, unaccountability, corruption, wastage and lack of 
transparency.  However, even if the available funds are expanded in consonance with 
desired intentions under improved control, they are not likely to bring a significant 
change in the outcome of war or in improving Pak-U.S. relations, owing to the clear 
imbalance in their allocations. While Pakistan lacks the infrastructure and credibility to 
consume allocated funds in accordance with their purpose, the U.S. fails to recognize the 
inherently faulty design of fund allocation that favors the short-term military objectives 
rather than the long-term strategic aspirations.   
                                                 
140 Cohen, A Perilous Course, x (Executive Summary). 
141 Mark S. Hamm, Two Years After 9/11: Assessing the War on Terrorism. In Mark Hamm and Paul 
Leighton (eds), Teaching and Understanding Sept 11, 2003, http://stopviolence.com, (accessed September 
12, 2011). 
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The game theoretical approach, to analyze the options for the two players in the 
future relationship, suggests a ‗cooperation strategy‘ solution where success depends on a 
number of variables and future U.S. policies. The game setting clearly manifests the 
relationship between its elements, Pakistan and the U.S. The benefits are measured in 
terms of political influence and the state‘s ability to advance its interests. While the 
benefits are directly proportional to the people‘s perception, this perception creates an 
enabling environment to increase both political influence and the benefits. Therefore, 
public perception is also directly proportional to the political influence. As per the game 
theory analysis, Pak-U.S. relations have now reached the same stage as at the onset six 
decades ago; however, now the stakes are much higher for both the players, particularly 
for Pakistan.  The U.S. may have better control over the situation but is not in a position 
to dictate its terms to Pakistan.  The game clearly suggests that Pakistan can secure a 
better outcome if it chooses to exercise alternative strategic options in reaction to the U.S. 
defection and vice versa.  Finally, the game hints at the conflict in interests of both the 
players, where associated cost creates a disabling environment that in turn affects strategy 
implementation. In order to secure better payoffs, both the players have the option to 
defect, worsening the relationship and creating conflict of interests. 
Pakistan‘s geo-strategic location, historical enmity with India (over Kashmir), 
instability/hostilities in/from Afghanistan, declining socio-political conditions, dismal 
state of economy, and rising extremism are the realities and need to be perceived as such.  
Barring the geography and Kashmir issues, the remaining problems are the by-products 
and implications of Pakistan‘s weak governance and its engagement with the U.S., 
respectively.  While the U.S. kept switching the relationship ON and OFF to suit its 
interests, Pakistan failed to foresee the grave implications of U.S. abandonment and 
continued its journey downward without exploring the available alternate strategic 
options.   
One of the major flaws in the Pak-U.S. relationship is the interest divergence of 
both countries.  While the U.S.‘ larger objectives in the region tend to promote Indian 
influence, Pakistan‘s security imperatives conflict with the U.S. intentions in 
Afghanistan.  While the U.S. aid is predominantly military in nature, the population‘s 
 106 
grievances continue to shape negative perceptions about the U.S.  The result is obvious: 
both countries have negative perceptions about each other at all levels.  While perceptual 
blocks may hamper the ability to build correct perceptions, collaboration and mature 
understanding of each other helps change realities on the ground, which in turn influences 
perception and perception shapes relationships. 
All nations strive to achieve their foreign policy goals and national interests and 
Pakistan is no exception. While the Pak-U.S. alliance in the fight against terrorism and 
the future of their relationship hangs in a delicate balance, there is no escaping the fact 
that both countries need each other for safeguarding their interests in the region. 
Introducing a population-centric approach, understanding each other‘s limitations, and 
promoting common goals is likely to reduce the trust deficit and contribute to achieving a 
favorable cost-benefit equation besides laying the foundation for a long-term strategic 
relationship.  In the Pak-U.S. relationship, the ground realities differ significantly from 
the perceptions of both Americans and Pakistanis.  However, perceptions can be changed 
by influence and the U.S. can exert this influence by shifting its focus from military to 
population.  In the panel‘s opinion, there cannot be a better opportunity than now for the 
U.S. to engage Pakistan in a long-term strategic relationship based on trust, mutual 
interests and deep understanding, an omission that has kept the U.S. from winning hearts 
and minds in Pakistan. 
A. THE WAY AHEAD 
The panel, after having considered major factors affecting the Pak-U.S. 
relationship and applying the game theoretical approach, recommends the following 
options and associated measures as the way ahead in improving the current state of Pak-
U.S. relations and laying the foundation for a long-term strategic partnership between the 
two nations.  
The U.S. can exercise two options: either to continue a renewed cooperation with 
Pakistan by using soft power, or to coerce Pakistan to cooperate while withdrawing all its 
current assistance.  If the U.S. opts to defect at this stage, it has to reduce its dependency 
on Pakistan, a proposition highly unsuitable to its national interests.  This option would 
 107 
not only deprive the U.S. of all the physical/material support through Pakistan and 
increase the cost of war significantly but would also deteriorate its ability to effectively 
continue its war on terror in the AfPak region.  The U.S. would also lose the very grounds 
that initiated the fight against terrorism besides losing credibility in the Muslim world in 
general and Pakistan in particular. Pakistan‘s sufferings would increase; however, 
exercising alternate strategic options of allying with Russia, China or Iran would not only 
open ways for Pakistan but also isolate the U.S. in the region.  
However, if the U.S. chooses to continue its cooperation with Pakistan, it needs to 
concentrate on the following measures in order to reap better returns on its investment in 
Pakistan.  These measures are listed in order of priority and as such are required to be 
adopted forthwith since time remains a crucial factor in their application:-   
1. Short-Term Measures ―Breaking the Frustration Cycle‖ 
a. Initiate Confidence Building Measures to bridge the trust deficit. 
b. Enhance communication, coordination, and constructive  engagements 
at multiple levels to eliminate misconceptions against each other. 
c. Launch favorable media campaign that mimics the Voice of America to 
publicize the positive aspects of the relationship in both countries. 
d. Provide a ‗population-specific‘ economic assistance aimed at  helping 
people to create positive public opinion. 
e. Address immediate military cooperation/coordination issues. 
2. Long-Term Measures ―Reinforcing Hope‖  
a. Renovate Relationship: Pakistan and the United States should renovate 
their relationship based on long-term objectives, common goals, mutual 
interests, regional stability/security, and better understanding. 
1) Understand Limitations: While the U.S. should comprehend 
Pakistan‘s limitations and strategic vulnerabilities, Pakistan should 
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concentrate  more on setting the house in order to better serve 
the common interests.   
2) Regional Approach: Promoting a regional approach for collective 
security, involving key players, is likely to advance the 
stabilization process in the  region.   
3) Address Key Issues: Understanding and resolving Pakistan‘s 
concerns regarding the Kashmir issue and Indian influence in 
Afghanistan would  not only reduce the divergence in the 
interests of the two allies but also promote  stability in the region. 
b. Population-centric Approach: In order to lay the foundation for a long-
term strategic relationship and a better return on its investment in Pakistan, 
the U.S. needs to adopt a more population-centric approach and enhance 
economic support to the country that has served vital U.S. interests and is 
critical to achieving regional U.S. foreign policy goals in the future.  
Pakistan is transitioning through one of the worst periods in its history and 
needs a reliable partner to  support its stabilization.  A more population-
centric approach aimed at improving social well-being, justice, security, 
economics and governance from the U.S. is likely to prove beneficial for 
both countries.  This approach should be adopted to accomplish the 
following measures: 
1) Providing education through schools would reduce indoctrination 
in Madrassahs besides bringing moderation to the society at a 
fractional cost of  what is being spent in ―firefighting‖ against 
the graduates of those Madrassahs. 
2) Creating employment opportunities and promoting entrepreneurial 
culture engages the youth in constructive activities and prevent 
them from falling  prey to extremism.  The U.S. assistance in 
establishing entrepreneurship and  micro-alliances would help 
reduce unemployment and dependence on foreign aid.  
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3) Assistance in energy sector/production would serve both in 
stability and addressing the grievances of population. 
4) Building communication and development infrastructure like 
roads, bridges, and dams helps in addressing public frustrations. 
5) Supporting the private sector, providing technical expertise in 
infrastructure development, and facilitating mutual trade and 
export would prove  beneficial for both the countries in the long 
run. 
6) Reshaping economic aid and enhancing long-term bilateral 
assistance to promote small projects involving people  and 
publicizing the same through media would enhance both the 
perceptions and relations. 
7) Creating measures to overcome corruption through accountability 
and a checks-and-balance system would help achieve better return 
on the U.S.  investment besides favorably influencing the 
culture. 
The population-centric approach/investment, involving the above-mentioned 
measures, besides laying the foundation for a long-term partnership, would also isolate 
extremists from the moderate populace and help in achieving the U.S. objectives in the 
region.  The U.S. would be able to exert larger influence in the region, have positive 
perceptions, and enhanced credibility in Pakistan and the Muslim world.  On the other 
side, it would enable Pakistan to address its security concerns, control extremism, and 
improve its domestic situation besides enhancing its image globally.  While population-
centric investment may take a decade or two to prove its effects, its benefits would 
certainly outweigh the costs and set the bricks in place for a long-term strategic Pak-U.S. 
relationship. 
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Stage One Solution 
The players‘ movement starts without communication. Table 16 shows the 
players‘ movement diagram.  Nash Arbitration demonstrates the likely outcome for the 
players. 





Coop  Defect 
U.S. 
Coop (3, 3)  (1, 4)   
      
Defect (4, 1)  (0,0)   
 




The movement diagram suggests that none of the players has a dominant strategy. 
Both players have an incentive to defect and enjoy a free ride at the other‘s expense. The 
game has three equilibrium points. Two are pure strategy Pareto optimal equilibrium 
points (4, 1) and (1, 4), while the third is a mixed strategy equilibrium. Nash 
equilibrium142 is (3, 3), where both players pursue cooperation. Nash equilibrium is 
defined as ―a set of strategies, one for each player, such that no player has incentive to 
unilaterally change her action. Players are in equilibrium if a change in strategies by any 
                                                 
142 Nash equilibrium calculations will be discussed thereafter. This point can be reached if both 
players play the game with 50% Coop. and 50% defect. 
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one of them would lead that player to earn less than if she remained with her current 
strategy.‖143  
Strategic Moves 
The game without communications revealed that both players do not have a 
dominant strategy that would eventually lead to the equilibrium point. It is instructive to 
examine what would happen if lines of communications were opened and the players 
have the ability to communicate. A strategic move analysis is demonstrated below to 
determine if any of the players has a threat or a promise or a combination of both, which, 
if communicated, would alter the game payoffs. 
1. Pakistan 
a. First Move: Pakistan  
1) If Pakistan pursues her Cooperate strategy, then the U.S. will 
choose Defect with payoffs (4, 1). 
2) If Pakistan does not choose Cooperate and Defect, then U.S. will 
pursue Cooperate with payoffs (1, 4). 
3) Pakistan, in this case, can secure a better payoff by pursuing her 
Defect strategy and get her best option of the likely outcomes (1, 
4).  
b. Threat: Pakistan 
1) Pakistan does not want the U.S. to pursue its likely strategy of 
Cooperate; therefore, Pakistan places her threat on the U.S.‘ 
Defect strategy. 
2) Normally: If the U.S. plays Cooperate, Pakistan plays Defect 
with payoffs (1,4) 
3) Threat: If the U.S. plays Cooperate, then Pakistan will 
Cooperate, which will credit the U.S. a higher payoff of 3, while 
Pakistan‘s payoff will be reduced to become 3. The final payoffs 
will be (3,3). 
                                                 
143 Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy 
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4) The threat hurts Pakistan, but it does not hurt the U.S., which 
means it is not a threat. Therefore, Pakistan does not have a 
threat. 
c. Promise: Pakistan 
1) Pakistan wants the U.S. to play its unlikely strategy Defect; 
therefore, Pakistan‘s promise will be on U.S.‘ Defect strategy. 
2) Normally: If the U.S. plays Defect, then Pakistan plays 
Cooperate, with payoffs of (4, 1). 
3) Promise: If the U.S. plays Defect, then Pakistan will play Defect 
with payoffs (0, 0). 
4) The promise hurts Pakistan, and does not benefit the U.S.; 
therefore, Pakistan does not have a promise. 
d. The threat and promise Combination is not available for Pakistan. 
2. The United States 
a. First Move: U.S. 
1) If the U.S. pursues Cooperate strategy, Pakistan will choose 
Defect with payoffs (1, 4). 
2) If the U.S. chooses to Defect, then Pakistan will pursue 
Cooperate with payoffs (4, 1). 
3) In this case, the U.S. can secure a better payoff by pursuing its 
Defect strategy and get its best option (4, 1). 
b. Threat:  
1) The U.S. does not want Pakistan to pursue its likely strategy 
Defect; therefore, the U.S. places its threat on Pakistan‘s 
Cooperate strategy. 
2) Normally: If Pakistan plays Cooperate, the U.S. plays Defect 
with payoffs (4, 1) 
3) Threat: If Pakistan plays Cooperate, the U.S. will pursue its 
Cooperate strategy that would increase Pakistan‘s payoff and 
reduce the U.S. payoffs to (3, 3). 
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4) If the threat hurts the U.S. and does not hurt Pakistan, it is not a 
threat. Therefore, the U.S. does not have a threat. 
c. Promise:  
1) The U.S. wants Pakistan‘s Cooperate strategy; therefore, the 
promise will be on Pakistan‘s Defect strategy. 
2) Normally: If Pakistan plays Defect, then the U.S. will play 
Cooperate with payoffs (1, 4). 
3) Promise: If Pakistan plays Defect then the U.S. will play Defect 
with payoffs (0, 0). 
4) Promise hurts the U.S., but does not benefit Pakistan; therefore, 
U.S. does not have a promise. 
d. The threat and promise Combination is not available for U.S. either. 
Neither the threat nor promise option works for both the players (i.e., even with 
communication, both players cannot secure better payoffs). In this situation, it is strongly 
recommended to look at the players‘ security levels and their prudential strategies.144 The 
security level technique is a method to determine the minimal payoff that a player can 
secure by playing his ―prudential strategy.‖ It gives a fair indication of the player‘s game 
value. By playing the prudential strategy, a player can assure that the least he gets is his 
security level, if his opponents choose to hold his payoffs down.
145
  
Security level Solution  
We extract both Pakistan‘s and the U.S.‘ games to find the security levels from 
the prudential strategy. 
1. Pakistan - Prudential Strategy – Solution 
a. Pakistan‘s game: Pakistan is maximizing ―Mini-max,‖ while the U.S. is 
minimizing ―maxi-min,‖ the opponent‘s payoff.  
                                                 
144 Philip Straffin defines the prudential strategy in a non-zero-sum game by the player‘s optimal 
strategy.  In this game, he defines the player‘s security level by the value of the player‘s game. For more 
read, Philip Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy. 
145 Philip D. Straffin, P.69.  
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b. It is a game with Pakistan‘s payoffs, and has a pure strategy solution. 
c. Table 17 shows Pakistan‘s payoffs and the game movement diagram: 




Coop.  Defect 
U.S. 
Coop. 3  4 4  
      
Defect 1  0 1 Dominant 
 




d. There is a solution in the pure strategy, where the U.S. has a dominant 
strategy ―pure prudential strategy‖ to play Defect 100% of the time 
whenever Pakistan plays Cooperate or Defect as depicted in Figure 14 and 
15. 
e. Pakistan should play her Cooperate strategy to face the U.S. defect 
strategy. 
f. The security level is Y=1; the value of the game is 1. 
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Figure 15. Shows Pakistan Maximizing Strategy (Stage 1) 
2. U.S. - Prudential Strategy – Solution 
a. U.S. game: The U.S. is maximizing ‗mini-max,‖ while Pakistan is 
minimizing ―maxi-min‖ the opponent‘s payoff. 
b. It has become a Zero-Sum Game with the U.S.‘ payoffs. 
c. Table 18 shows the U.S. payoffs and the game movement diagram: 
 




Coop.  Defect 
U.S. 








 Defect 4  0 0 
 





d. The U.S. has a pure prudential strategy to play Defect whenever Pakistan 
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Figure 17. Shows Pakistan Minimizing Strategy (Stage 1) 
 
e. The security level is X=1; the value of the game is 1. Figure 18 shows the 
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Figure 18. The Players‘ Security Levels. (Stage 1) 
The Equalizing Strategy 
3. Pakistan - Equalizing Strategy – Solution 
a. U.S. game: Pakistan is equalizing, while U.S. is maximizing.  
b. It is a Zero-sum game with U.S. payoffs. 
c. The movement diagram is depicted in Table 19: 




Coop.  Defect 
U.S. 
Coop. 3  1 1  
 
 
   
 
 
 Defect 4  0 0 
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d. The U.S. does not have a pure dominant strategy; therefore, Pakistan has 
to play a mixed strategy with 50% Cooperate and 50% Defect to equalize 
the U.S. The value of the game will become 2. Figure 19 represents 




Figure 19. Pakistan Equalizing Strategy (Stage 1) 
4. U.S. - Equalizing Strategy – Solution 
a. Pakistan‘s game, Pakistan is maximizing, while the U.S. is equalizing. 
b. It has become a Zero-Sum Game with Pakistan‘s payoffs. 
c. Table 20 shows the U.S. equalizing game movement diagram: 




Coop.  Defect 
U.S. 
Coop. 3  4 3   
     
 
Defect 1  0 4 
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d. There is no pure strategy solution; Pakistan does not have pure dominant 
strategy. Therefore, the U.S. has to play a mixed strategy to equalize 
Pakistan with 50% Cooperate and 50% Defect. The value of the game is 2. 
Figure 20 shows the U.S. equalizing strategy. Consequently, Figure 21 
illustrates the first stage Nash equalizing point and the players‘ strategies.  
 
 
Figure 20. U.S. Equalizing Strategy (Stage 1) 
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Nash Arbitration (Stage 1) 
From the above solution of security level, prudential strategy and the equalizing 
strategy, the players‘ status quo is (1, 1) and the Nash equilibrium point is (3, 3). Nash 
Arbitration Point is also (3, 3). Figure 22 revels geometrically the first stage status quo 




Figure 22. The 1st Stage Status Quo and Nash Point. 
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Stage two Solution: One-Side Game 
The players‘ movement starts without communication. The game has only one 
equilibrium point instead of the three equilibrium points in the previous game. Table 21 
demonstrates the players‘ movement diagram. 




Coop.  Defect 
U.S. 
Coop. (1, 2)  (0, 4)   
   
 
  
Defect (4, 1)  (2, 0)   
 
   
 
  
The movement diagram demonstrates the U.S. dominant strategy to defect, on the 
other hand Pakistan does not have a dominant strategy. The game now has one 
equilibrium point. Nash equilibrium is (4, 1), where U.S. defects and Pakistan cooperates.  
Strategic Moves 
The game without communications has demonstrated that if the game were played 
the likely outcome would be (4, 1), where the U.S. has a Defect dominant strategy.  The 
strategic move analysis will examine if any of the players can alter the game. 
1. Pakistan 
a. First Move: Pakistan  
1) If Pakistan pursues her Cooperate strategy, then the U.S. will 
choose Defect with payoffs (4, 1). 
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2) If Pakistan does not choose Cooperate and Defects, then the U.S. 
will pursue defect too with payoffs (2, 0), which will harm 
Pakistan. 
3) Pakistan in this case can secure a better payoff by pursuing her 
Cooperate strategy and get her third best option of the likely 
outcome (4, 1). 
b. Threat: Pakistan 
1) Pakistan does not want the U.S. to pursue its likely strategy 
Defect; therefore, Pakistan places her threat on the U.S.‘ Defect 
strategy. 
2) Normally: If the U.S. defects, Pakistan plays Cooperate with 
payoffs (4, 1) 
3) Threat: If the U.S. plays Defect, then, Pakistan Defects with a 
payoff (2, 0), which will reduce both Pakistan‘s and the U.S.‘ 
payoffs. 
4) The threat hurts both Pakistan and the U.S., which means it is a 
threat. Therefore, Pakistan has a threat that does not work alone. 
Since if the U.S. Cooperates, Pakistan may Defect with payoffs 
(0, 4).    
c. Promise: Pakistan 
1) Pakistan wants the U.S. to play its unlikely strategy; therefore, 
Pakistan promise will be on the U.S.‘ Cooperate strategy. 
2) Normally: If the U.S. plays Cooperate, then, Pakistan plays 
Defect with payoffs of (0, 4). 
3) Promise: If the U.S. plays Cooperate, then Pakistan will play 
Cooperate with payoffs (1, 2). 
4) The promise hurts Pakistan, and it is beneficial to the U.S. 
However, Pakistan‘s promise does not work alone. If the U.S. 
Defects and Pakistan Cooperates, that will leave the U.S. with 
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payoffs of (4, 1), which is better than the promise. So Pakistan 
has a promise that does not work alone. 
d. The threat and promise Combination is not available for Pakistan. 
The threat leaves the players with (2, 0) and the promise leaves them with 
(1, 2), which is not better than the likely outcome without 
communications. 
2. U.S. 
a. First Move: 
1) If the U.S. pursues its Cooperate strategy, Pakistan will choose 
Defect with payoffs (0, 4). 
2) If the U.S. chooses Defect, then Pakistan will pursue Cooperate 
with payoffs (4, 1). 
3) The U.S., in this case, can secure a better payoff by pursuing its 
Defect strategy and get its best option (4, 1). 
 
b. Threat:  
1) The U.S. does not want Pakistan to pursue its Defect strategy; 
therefore, the U.S. places its threat on Pakistan‘s Defect strategy. 
2) Normally: If Pakistan plays Cooperate, the U.S. plays Defect 
with payoffs (4, 1) 
3) Threat: If Pakistan plays Cooperate, the U.S. will pursue its 
Cooperate strategy, which will increase Pakistan‘s payoff and 
reduce the U.S.‘ payoffs to (1, 2). 
4) The threat hurts the U.S. and does not hurt Pakistan; it is not a 
threat. Therefore, the U.S. does not have any threat. 
c. Promise:  
1) The U.S. wants Pakistan‘s Cooperate strategy; therefore, the 
promise will be on Pakistan‘s Cooperate strategy. 
2) Normally: If Pakistan plays Defect, then the U.S. plays Defect 
with payoffs of (2, 0). 
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3) Promise: If Pakistan plays Defect then the U.S. will play 
Cooperate with payoffs (0, 4). 
4) The promise hurts the U.S. and benefits Pakistan; it is a promise 
that works alone, where if Pakistan Cooperates, then the U.S. 
Defects with payoffs of (4, 1). Therefore, the U.S. has a promise 
that works alone but it leaves the U.S. with its worst option; 
where it is not better than the likely outcome without 
communications. 
d. The threat and promise Combination is not available for U.S. 
While Pakistan has a combination of threat and promise that does not work, it 
cannot force the U.S. to go below the likely outcome without communication. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. has only a promise that works alone but it is not better than what the 
U.S. can get without communication. This suggests that the U.S. has the initiative that 
controls the engagement in the game, so whenever the U.S. wants to obtain Pakistan‘s 
cooperation, it will use its promise, thereafter, disengage and maximize its benefit. The 
game provides an explanation to the ―Roller Coaster‖146 character of the U.S.-Pakistan 
relation. This strategy suits the U.S. regional engagements, where the U.S. can get 
Pakistan‘s cooperation without any commitment. 
Security level Solution  
1. Pakistan – Prudential Strategy – Solution 
a. Pakistan‘s game: Pakistan is maximizing ―Mini-max,‖ while the U.S. is 
minimizing ―maxi-min‖ the opponent‘s payoff.  
b. It is a game with Pakistan‘s payoffs, and has a pure strategy solution. 





                                                 
146 Pakistan founders‘ aspirations and today‘s realities. 287. 
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Coop.  Defect 
U.S. 
Coop. 2  4 4  
      
Defect 1  0 1 Dominant 
 




d. There is a solution in the pure strategy, where the U.S. has a dominant 
strategy ―pure prudential strategy‖ to play Defect 100% of the time 
whenever Pakistan plays Cooperate or Defect as depicted in Figures 23 
and 24 respectively. 
e. Pakistan plays her Cooperate strategy to face the U.S. Defect strategy all 
the time. 
f. The security level is Y=1; the value of the game is 1. 
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Figure 24. Pakistan maximizing strategy (Stage 2) 
2. U.S. - Prudential Strategy – Solution 
a. The U.S.‘ game, the U.S. is maximizing ―Mini-max,‖ while Pakistan is 
minimizing ―maxi-min‖ the opponent‘s payoff. 
b. It has become a Zero-Sum Game with U.S.‘ payoffs. 
c. Table 23 shows U.S. prudential strategy movement diagram (Stage 2) 
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U.S. 
Coop. 1  0 0  
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d. U.S. has a pure prudential strategy to play Defect whenever Pakistan plays 
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Figure 25. Pakistan minimizing strategy (Stage 2) 
 
 
Figure 26. U.S. maximizing strategy (Stage 2) 
 
e. The security level is X=2; the value of the game is 2. Figure 27 reveals the 
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Figure 27. Game Security Level (Stage 2) 
 
The U.S. prudential strategy increased their security level to their 2
nd
 best option 
and lavarage its ability to control the engagment, however, the U.S. strategy also 
neglected the public perciption and shifted the relation to become short-term. The model 
also captures the trend of the U.S.-Relation during that time.  The U.S. has a prudential 
dominate strategy to defect 100% of the time. Pakistan is restricted to only use her 
cooperation strategy always, especially, if Pakistan sought to hold U.S. payoffs down at 
any point of the game. The security level for Pakistan is (1) which is her third option and 
her game value is one too. In contrast, the U.S.‘s security level is (2) with their dominant 
strategy which holds Pakistan‘s payoffs down throughout the game, additionally the 
game value for U.S. in this case is two, their second best option. The short-term strategis 
in this era deterorated the Pakistani public perception and strngthined her military. 
The equilizing Strategy 
1. Pakistan’s Equalizing Strategy 
a. U.S. game: Pakistan is equalizing, while U.S. is maximizing.  
b. It is a Zero-sum game with U.S. payoffs. 
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Coop.  Defect 
U.S. 
Coop. 1  0 0  
     
 
 
 Defect 4  2 2 
 




d. Both players have a dominant strategy to defect. However, Pakistan does 
not have an equalizing strategy against U.S.. As a result nothing can be 
done from the Pakistani side to equalize U.S.. Figure 28 shows Pakistan 
equalizing strategy.   
 
Figure 28. Pakistan Equalizing Strategy (Stage 2) 
 
2. U.S. - Equalizing Strategy 
a. Pakistan‘s game, Pakistan is maximizing, while U.S. is equalizing. 
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c. Table 25 shows the U.S. equalizing strategy movement diagram: 
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U.S. 







Defect 1  0 1 
 




d. There is no pure strategy solution; Pakistan does not have pure dominant 
strategy. Therefore, U.S. have to play a mixed strategy to equalize 
Pakistan with 1/3 of the times Coop. and 2/3 Defect. The value of the 
game is 1.33333. The value of the game is less than U.S. security level; 
there will be no incentive for the U.S. to use such strategy since they can 
otherwise get more. Figure 29 shows the U.S. equalizing strategy. 
 


















-0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 
Equalizing 
US Pure Coop US Pure Defect PAK Pure Coop PAK Pure Defect  mixed  
 138 
Nash Arbitration (Stage Two) 
From the above solution of the security level, prudential strategy and the 
equalizing strategy the players‘ status quo is (2, 1) and the Nash arbitration point is (3, 
1.75) as shown in Figure 30. To get this value, Pakistan has to play 75% Cooperation and 
25% Defect, while the U.S. has to play 25% Coop. and 75% Defect. Figure 31 
demonstrates Nash point geometrical solution.  
 
Figure 30. Status Quo and Nash Point (Stage 2) 
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Figure 31. Nash Point Geometrical Solution (Stage 2) 
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Stage Three Solution 
The movement diagram in Table 26 suggests that none of the players has a 
dominant strategy; however, the game in this stage has three Nash equilibrium points. 
Two equilibrium points are pure strategy equilibrium points, while the third is a mixed 
strategy. 




Coop.  Defect 
U.S. 
Coop. (2, 1)  (1, 3)   
      
Defect (3, -2)  (-1, -3)   
 





The game without communications revealed that both players do not have a 
dominant strategy that would eventually lead to the equilibrium point. In this section, we 
will analyze the players‘ strategic moves and their threats and promises.  
1. Pakistan 
a. First Move: Pakistan  
1) If Pakistan pursues her Coop. strategy, then U.S. will choose 
Defect with payoffs (3,-2). 
2) If Pakistan does not choose Coop. and Defect, then U.S. will 
pursue Coop. with payoffs (1, 3). 
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3) Pakistan in this case can secure a better payoff by starting the 
game with a defect strategy where she can secure better outcome 
by communicating its intentions to the U.S. and end up in a 
better negotiation stand with a potential payoff of (1, 3).  
b. Threat: Pakistan 
1) Pakistan does not want U.S. to pursue its likely strategy Coop.; 
therefore, Pakistan places her threat on the U.S.‘s Coop. strategy. 
2) Normally: If the U.S. plays Coop, Pakistan plays Defect with 
payoffs (1, 3) 
3) Threat: If the U.S. plays Coop, then Pakistan will Coop, this will 
increase the U.S. payoff to become 2, while it hurts Pakistan and 
leave her with a payoff of 1. The final payoffs will be (2, 1). 
4) The threat hurts Pakistan, but it does not hurt the U.S., which 
means it is not a threat. Therefore, Pakistan does not have a 
threat. 
c. Promise: Pakistan 
1) Pakistan wants the U.S. to play its unlikely strategy Defect; 
therefore, Pakistan promise will be on U.S.‘s Defect strategy. 
2) Normally: If U.S. play Defect, then, Pakistan plays Coop. with 
payoffs of (3, -2). 
3) Promise: If U.S. play Defect then Pakistan will play Defect with 
payoffs (-1, -3). 
4) The promise hurts Pakistan, and does not benefit U.S.; therefore, 
Pakistan does not have a promise. 
d. The threat and promise Combination is not available for Pakistan. 
2. U.S. 
a. First Move: U.S. 
1) If the U.S. pursues Coop. strategy, Pakistan will choose Defect 
with payoffs    (1, 3). 
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2) If the U.S. chooses to Defect, then Pakistan will pursue Coop 
with payoffs (3, -2). 
3) In this case, the U.S. can secure a better payoff by pursuing its 
Defect strategy and get its best option (3, -2). U.S. have an 
advantage of moving first and communicating their strategy to 
Pakistan. 
b. Threat:  
1) The U.S. does not want Pakistan to pursue its likely strategy 
―Coop.,‖ therefore, the U.S. place its threat on Pakistan‘s Coop. 
strategy. 
2) Normally: If Pakistan plays Coop, the U.S. plays Defect with 
payoffs (3, -2) 
3) Threat: If Pakistan plays Coop, the U.S. will pursue its Coop 
strategy that would increase Pakistan‘s payoff and reduce the 
U.S. payoffs to (2, 1). 
4) If the threat hurts the U.S. and does not hurt Pakistan, it is not a 
threat. Therefore, U.S. do not have a threat. 
c. Promise:  
1) The U.S. wants Pakistan‘s Coop strategy; therefore, the promise 
will be on Pakistan‘s Defect strategy. 
2) Normally: If Pakistan plays Defect, then the U.S. will play Coop. 
with payoffs (1, 3). 
3) Promise: If Pakistan plays Defect then the U.S. will play Defect 
with payoffs (-1, -3). 
4) Promise hurts the U.S., but does not benefit Pakistan; therefore, 
U.S. does not have a promise. 
d. The threat and promise Combination is not available for U.S. either. 
Although both players have an advantage by moving first, they have neither the 
threat nor the promise option available to support their move, which suggest that the 
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players cannot improve their payoffs by using the strategic moves. The likely outcome 
will remain the best payoffs the players can secure.  
Security level Solution  
We extract both Pakistan‘s and the U.S.‘s games to find the security levels from 
the prudential strategy. 
1. Pakistan - Prudential Strategy – Solution 
a. Pakistan‘s game: Pakistan is maximizing ―Mini-max,‖ while the U.S. is 
minimizing ―maxi-min‖ the opponent‘s payoff. 
b. It is a game with Pakistan‘s payoffs, and has a pure strategy solution. 
c. Table 27 shows Pakistan‘s payoffs and the game movement diagram: 
 




Coop.  Defect 
U.S. 
Coop. 1  3 3  
      
Defect -2  -3 -2 Dominant 
 




d. There is a pure strategy solution in the game, where Pakistan has to play 
her Coop. strategy 100% of the time, whenever the U.S. plays their Defect 
strategy as shown in Figure 32 and 33. 
e. Pakistan should play her Coop strategy to face the U.S. defect strategy. 
f. The security level is Y=-2; the value of the game for Pakistan is -2. 
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Figure 32. U.S. Minimizing Strategy (Stage 3) 
 
Figure 33. Pakistan Maximizing Strategy (stage 3) 
 
2. U.S. - Prudential Strategy – Solution 
a. U.S. game: The U.S. is maximizing ‗mini-max,‖ while Pakistan is 
minimizing ―maxi-min‖ the opponent‘s payoff. 
b. It has become a Zero-Sum Game with the U.S.‘s payoffs. 
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Table 28.   U.S. Prudential Strategy Movement Diagram (Stage 3) 
 
d. The U.S. has a pure prudential strategy to play Coop. whenever Pakistan 
plays Defect as depicted in Figure 34 and 35. 
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Coop.  Defect 
U.S. 








 Defect 3  -1 -1 
 





Figure 35. Pakistan minimizing strategy (Stage 3) 
 
e. The security level is X=1; the value of the game is 1. Figure 36 shows the 
game security levels.  
 
 
Figure 36. The Players Security Levels 
The equilizing Strategy (Stage Three) 
1. Pakistan - Equalizing Strategy – Solution 
a. U.S. game: Pakistan is equalizing, while U.S. is maximizing.  
b. It is a Zero-sum game with U.S. payoffs. 
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Coop.  Defect 
U.S. 
Coop. 2  1   
 
 
   
 
 
 Defect 3  -1  
 
   
 
  
          
d. U.S. do not have a pure dominant strategy; therefore, Pakistan has to play 
a mixed strategy with 2/3 Coop and 1/3 Defect to equalize U.S. The U.S. 
value of the game will become 1.6667. Figure 37 represents the equalizing 
strategy. 
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2. U.S. - Equalizing Strategy – Solution 
a. Pakistan‘s game, Pakistan is maximizing, while the U.S. is equalizing. 
b. It has become a Zero-Sum Game with Pakistan‘s payoffs. 
c. Table 30 shows the U.S. equalizing game: 
 




Coop.  Defect 
U.S. 







Defect -2  -3 -2 
 
-2  -3 
 
  
             
 
d. There is no pure strategy solution; Pakistan does not have pure dominant 
strategy. Therefore, the U.S. has to play a mixed strategy to equalize 
Pakistan with 1/3 Coop and 2/3 Defect.  Pakistan‘s value of the game is -1. 
Figure 38 shows the U.S. equalizing strategy. 
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Figure 38. U.S. Equalizing Strategy (Stage 3) 
Pakistan does not have a pure equalizing strategy; she has to play a mixed strategy 
with 2/3 of the time cooperation and 1/3 defect to equalize the U.S. Her game value will 
be 1.66667. For Pakistan the equalizing strategy provide better payoffs than likely 
outcome or Nash arbitration. On the other hand the U.S. also have to play a mixed 
strategy with 1/3 of the time cooperation and 2/3 defect to equalize Pakistan. The U.S. 
game value will be -1. The U.S. is in better situation and does not need to use such 
strategy to equalize Pakistan. 
From the above, the players‘ status quo is (1, -2) and Nash arbitration is (2, 1). 
Nash arbitration can be either reached by playing mixed strategies, or pure cooperation 
strategy by both players. Figure 39 demonstrates stage three status quo and Nash point. 
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Figure 39. The Game Status Quo and Nash Point (Stage 3) 
Coop:Coop [2 , 1] 
Coop:Defect [1 , 3] 
Defect:Coop [3 , -2] 
Defect:Defect [-1 , -3] 
SQ [1 , -2] 
NashPoint [2 , 
1] 
Xo = 1 
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Figure 40. The Game Geometrical Solution (Stage 3) 
Coop:Coop [2 , 1] 
Coop:Defect [1 , 3] 
Defect:Coop [3 , -2] 
Defect:Defect [-1 , -3] 
SQ [1 , -2] 
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